

Japan's 'Just Transition' in Its Development Practices⁺

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Key Words: climate change, energy transition, just transition, Japan's ODA, JETP

[ABSTRACT]

Japan has focused its Official Development Assistance (ODA) on underdeveloped countries in Asia, in part to compensate for the damage it caused during World War II. Although energy transition and climate change response were not the main agendas of Japan's ODA to Asia, it gradually became concerned about the quality of its ODA projects in order to differentiate itself from the rapidly rising China. In addition, as a member of the G7 and G20, Japan's reputation among other countries has become more important, and there has been a recent trend in Japan's ODA to reflect energy transition to combat climate change, as well as just transition. The Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) with Indonesia and Vietnam is a reflection of this recent trend. Japan has historically provided various forms of energy-related ODA to Indonesia and Vietnam, many of which have been for fossil fuel-fired power-related facilities. Now, Japan is developing plans to ensure that a 'just energy transition' is possible in these countries as well. But so far, the reviews have been less than positive. Ultimately, for these projects to be successful, the voices of various actors in society will need to be heard, and interactive discussions will need to take place from the planning stage to build social consensus.

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I. Introduction

Japan's foreign policy throughout the Cold War was guided by three diplomatic principles: (1) UN-centrism, (2) positioning itself as a member of Asia, and (3) cooperation with liberal states, and it has a history of emphasizing 'cooperation', which involves establishing diplomatic relations with all countries without conflict.¹⁾ As an extension of this, the third Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), or COP3, was held in Kyoto in December 1997, so the issue of combating climate change became an important part of Japanese foreign policy early on. In particular, the Japanese government has consistently emphasized that the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are common goals for both developed and developing countries. As such, it has self-selected tasks that are priorities for Japan, with the goal of leading efforts to achieve the global SDGs as a developed country. It has also emphasized that SDGs cannot be achieved without the participation of various members of society, including businesses, both in terms of content and financing.²⁾

In short, Japan has consistently valued, and has been proactive in addressing climate change early on. On October 26, 2020, when Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide was in power, he delivered a speech to the 203rd Extraordinary Session of the Diet, stating, "My country (Japan) aims to realize a carbon neutral, decarbonized society by 2050, with overall zero emissions of greenhouse gas by 2050."³⁾ Japan is one of the countries

1) 이기태, "협력과 충돌의 대외전략: 일본의 아시아 외교를 중심으로," 『일본연구논총』 제44호 (현대일본학회, 2016), p. 136.

2) 이창언, "일본 정부의 SDGs 이행 실천 현황과 도전과제," 『NGO연구』 제15권 제3호 (한국NGO학회, 2020), pp. 251, 260.

3) 要地 正義·菰田 馨, "菅首相, 2050年カーボンニュートラル宣言の舞台裏," 『日経エネルギーNext』 2020年10月26日, <https://project.nikkeibp.co.jp/energy/atcl/19/feature/00001/00036/>

that legislated a 2050 carbon neutrality goal. Japan's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) is a 46% reduction from 2013 levels by 2030, and it will strive for a 50% reduction.⁴⁾

This article reviews the history of Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA), outlines the significance of Southeast Asia, energy, and related issues such as climate change and just transition in Japan's development cooperation policy, and summarizes the two Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) programs in Indonesia and Vietnam in which Japan is involved. In addition, it critically examines the current evaluations of the two JETP programs in Japan and abroad to identify challenges the programs face. It also seeks to analyze how Japan, which has been relatively proactive in addressing climate change, is dealing with climate change in its international development cooperation, and how the issue of a 'just transition' is being applied in Japanese foreign policy circles, and to highlight some related activities. In doing so, this article aims to reexamine the role of Official Development Assistance in implementing a just transition and to draw some meaningful policy implications for governments in other countries that can be facing criticism for 'greenwashing'⁵⁾ their development cooperation policies.

This article is organized as follows. The next chapter provides a quick summary of the history of Japan's international development cooperation and examines the meaning of the climate change response component of Japan's development cooperation policy and the discourse on a 'just

(Accessed October 29, 2023).

4) UNFCCC, "Japan's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)," October 22, 2021, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-06/JAPAN_FIRST%20NDC%20%28UPDATED%20SUBMISSION%29.pdf (Accessed October 13, 2023).

5) "Greenwashing is the act of making false or misleading statements about the environmental benefits of a product or practice." Courtney Lindwall, "What Is Greenwashing?" *Natural Resources Defense Council* February 9, 2023, <https://www.nrdc.org/stories/what-greenwashing> (Accessed April 13, 2024).

transition'. Chapter 3 introduces the cases that are related to a 'just transition' in Japan's ODA policy. Chapter 4 summarizes internal and external assessments of Japan's approach and identifies areas that are currently problematic, drawing policy implications for the future. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes by summarizing implications found from this study.

II. Overview on Japan's Development Cooperation Policy

Before examining how climate change response and just transition are being addressed in Japan's international development cooperation policy, a brief look at its history is necessary.

The history of Japan's ODA can be traced back to reparations for the damage inflicted by Imperial Japan on Asian countries during World War II. In September 1951, Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty with the United States, which resulted in reparations for the first four countries, Myanmar, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam, and aid equivalent to reparations for Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Singapore.

In October 1954, Japan joined the Colombo Plan, a development assistance plan for Southeast Asia, and began technical cooperation, and in 1958, yen loans to India began, which added the purpose of export promotion to ODA. Japan made export promotion a policy objective of its ODA until 1972, when Japan decided to untie it from ODA. In 1960, Japan joined the Development Action Group (DAG) as a founding member, and the following year, with the establishment of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), DAG was transformed into the Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

As the scale of ODA expanded, Japan established the Overseas

Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) in 1961 as a substantive body for yen loans and the Overseas Technology Cooperation Agency (OTCA) in 1962 as a body for technical cooperation. In 1974, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was established, merging the International Migration Division and OTCA. In 1999, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), a merger of the Export-Import Bank of Japan and the OECF, was established, but in 2008, JICA took over JBIC's overseas economic cooperation work and grant-funded cooperation work of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), making it the agency that manages ODA work in general.⁶⁾

Meanwhile, an important document that identifies the guiding principles of Japan's development cooperation policy is the 'Development Cooperation Charter (DCC: 開発協力大綱)'. Japan's Official Development Assistance Charter (ODAC: 政府開発援助大綱) was decided by the Cabinet in 1992 and revised in 2003, which has been regarded as the foundation of Japan's ODA policy. ODAC was replaced by the DCC in February 2015, and the DCC was revised once more in June 2023.

According to the 2015 DCC, 'development cooperation' refers to 'international cooperation activities that are conducted by the government and its affiliated agencies for the main purpose of development in developing regions.' It is stated that 'development cooperation' aims to enhance synergies for development by strengthening collaboration with other funding and activities of the Government of Japan and its affiliated agencies such as Other Official Flows (OOFs) and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) as well as with private funding and activities whose objective is development or which

6) The above explanations on Japan's development cooperation history are based on the following sources. 大山 尚, "我が国のODAの姿 ~ 東南アジア地域を例として," 『経済のプリズム』 No.191 (参議院: 2020), pp. 9-35; 那須 祐輔, "日本の対アジアODAの諸問題," 『経済政策研究』 第2号 (香川大学経済政策研究室: 2006), pp. 33-57.

contribute to development.⁷⁾

MOFA's position on the revision of the DCC can be summarized as follows. The international community is at a historical turning point, facing (1) escalating global challenges such as climate change and infectious diseases, (2) challenges to a free and open international order and escalating risks of fragmentation, and (3) complex crises such as humanitarian crises in developing countries linked to the above challenges. In addition, loans by emerging donors that disregard debt sustainability will not lead to growth in developing countries, and the international community, as a whole, needs to cooperate in a coordinated manner based on transparent and fair rules. In this context, it has become more important to collaborate with diverse actors, including the private sector and civil society, and to work toward mobilizing new sources of funding to meet the growing need for development finance. It is necessary for the international community to cooperate to overcome the crisis, overcoming differences in values and other obstacles. Japan is in a position to lead this effort. Therefore, in order to make more effective and strategic use of development cooperation, one of the most important tools of diplomacy, Japan has revised its DCC to set a new direction for development cooperation.⁸⁾

In short, MOFA explained that it was necessary to revise the DCC to better reflect the needs of the times, as it is necessary to utilize policies in the field of development cooperation to overcome the complex and global-scale crisis facing the international community, and the cooperation of not only the government but also the private sector and civil society is important in implementing development cooperation

7) MOFA, "Cabinet Decision on the Development Cooperation Charter," February 10, 2015, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000067701.pdf> (Accessed April 13, 2024).

8) 開発協力推進委員会政策部会, "新たな開発協力大綱案," 『週刊 経団連タイムス』 No.3591 (外務省: 2023).

policies.

The revised DCC sets forth the following as basic policy for development cooperation: (1) contributing to peace and prosperity, (2) 'human security' in the new era, (3) co-creation of social values through dialogue and cooperation with developing countries, and (4) leading the dissemination and implementation of international rules and guidelines based on inclusiveness, transparency, and fairness. Furthermore, the DCC sets priority policies as follows: (1) 'quality growth' in the new era and poverty eradication through such growth, (2) realization of peaceful, secure, and stable societies, and maintenance and strengthening of a free and open international order based on the rule of law, and (3) leading international efforts to address increasingly complex and serious global issues.⁹⁾ The DCC is addressing climate change in the third category, 'increasingly complex and serious global issues'. As climate change and environmental degradation pose a threat to the sustainable development of all countries, Japan has stated that it will support developing countries in both mitigation and adaptation to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement.¹⁰⁾

Then what does a 'just transition' mean in Japan's development cooperation policy? The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines 'just transition' as 'greening the economy in a way that is as fair and inclusive as possible to everyone concerned, creating decent work opportunities and leaving no one behind.'¹¹⁾ The concept of a just transition does not appear explicitly in the DCC. However, as mentioned

9) MOFA, "Development Cooperation Charter – Japan's Contributions to the Sustainable Development of a Free and Open World," June 2023, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100514705.pdf> (Accessed April 13, 2024).

10) MOFA (2023).

11) UNDP, "What Is Just Transition? And Why Is It Important?" November 3, 2022, <https://climatepromise.undp.org/news-and-stories/what-just-transition-and-why-it-important> (Accessed October 13, 2023).

earlier, Japan was an early adopter of SDGs in its foreign policy as an extension of its UN-centrism, so phrases related to this concept also appear in the DCC. The principle of reflecting ‘gender equality’ and ensuring ‘fairness’ in development cooperation is confirmed.

While the DCC outlines the principles of Japan’s development cooperation policy, the government document that provides the most detailed information on Japan’s development cooperation and ODA is the ODA White Paper (開発協力白書), published annually by MOFA. The concept of just transition has been in the Japanese ODA white paper since the 2022 edition. In the 2022 edition of the ODA White Paper, the term ‘just energy transition (公正なエネルギー移行)’ began to appear instead of ‘just transition (公正な移行)’, and it is interesting to note that the 2022 White Paper frames it in terms of alignment with other countries and international organizations.¹²⁾ In the following chapter, the context in which a just transition is addressed in terms of energy issues and connections to other countries will be discussed, and specific examples will be provided.

III. Energy and Just Transition in Japan’s Development Performances

Japan’s ODA has traditionally been concentrated in Asia due to the historical background explained earlier, and has tended to focus on infrastructure construction related to transportation and shipping. According to JICA’s data, Asia has the largest number of Japanese ODA projects, totaling 2,915, followed by Africa (1,226), Central and South America (527), the Middle East (329), Oceania (179), and Europe (121).

12) 外務省, 『開発協力白書—日本の国際協力(2022年度版)』(東京: 外務省, 2023), p. 145.

Breaking Japanese ODA projects down by project purpose, the largest number of projects are for transportation (1,023) and for water resources and disaster prevention (748). A total of 536 ODA projects fell into the resources/energy sector, and a similarly large number goes to health and medical care (574), to agriculture development/rural development (535), and to education (530).¹³⁾

Lim pointed out that while Japan has long been one of the largest donors in Southeast Asia, its position in the region has become relatively narrower due to China's rapid rise, massive financial resources, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Moreover, as China's foreign aid strategy overlaps with Japan's development cooperation policy, especially in Southeast Asia, Japan is facing deep policy challenges to better utilize its limited resources and manpower for development cooperation.¹⁴⁾ Japan's emphasis on providing so-called quality infrastructure in its ODA policy was also intended to differentiate itself in the face of competition from China.

Meanwhile, energy and climate change responses have not traditionally been a large part of Japanese ODA. In 2022, the most recent year for which statistics are available, the largest share of Japan's bilateral ODA (combining grant aid, technical cooperation, total grants, and loan aids) was in economic infrastructure and services. These include transportation and storage, communications, energy, banking and financial services, and business support. Economic infrastructure and services accounted for 44.42% (USD 8,272.95 million) of total bilateral development assistance in 2022, with energy accounting for 5.06% (USD 942.93 million).¹⁵⁾ The year before, 2021, Japan invested more heavily in the

13) JICA, "ODA見える化サイト", <https://www.jica.go.jp/oda/> (Accessed April 13, 2024).

14) 임은정, "일본의 에너지·환경 ODA 추진 동향과 시사점 - 동남아시아 및 중앙아시아 사례를 중심으로," 『해외환경통합정보망(EISHUB) 2021년도 전문가 보고서』 (2021), p. 10.

15) 外務省, 『開発協力白書—日本の国際協力(2023年度版)』 (東京: 外務省, 2024), p. 161.

energy sector than other years. Economic infrastructure and services accounted for 35.77% (USD 5,511.98 million) of total bilateral development assistance in 2021, with energy accounting for 13.50% (USD 2,080.74 million).¹⁶⁾

However, it is fair to say that 2021 was an exceptional year. In the previous year's results, 2020, the energy sector accounted for only 2.32% (USD 515.22 million), even though the economic infrastructure and services sector had a larger share of 42.05% (USD 9,354.25 million).¹⁷⁾ While the amount of bilateral ODA has decreased substantially from 2021, a significant increase in the share of energy is notable. In addition, compared to other countries, Japan's contribution to climate change action through ODA has been relatively large. Park analyzed that Japan is the largest donor of climate aid, with USD 19 billion focused on climate issues and USD 130 billion on projects with climate issues as ancillary objectives.¹⁸⁾

While a 'just transition' has not yet become a major topic of discussion within Japanese development cooperation policy circles, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Japan is looking at the issue from the perspective of aligning with other countries and international organizations. The preamble to the Paris Agreement, adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) to UNFCCC in 2015, states that the parties of the Agreement should take into account the imperatives of a just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined development priorities. In 2020, the Secretariat of UNFCCC released a technical paper entitled 'Just Transition of the Workforce, and the Creation of Decent Work and

16) 外務省, 『開発協力白書—日本の国際協力(2022年度版)』(東京: 外務省, 2023), p. 163.

17) 外務省, 『開発協力白書—日本の国際協力(2021年度版)』(東京: 外務省, 2022), p. 153.

18) 박혜윤, "제5차 기후변화 대응을 위한 국제개발협력의 정치경제," 이태동 편, 『기후변화와 정치경제: 국제통상, 기업, 기술』(서울: 박영사, 2023), pp. 152-153.

Quality Jobs' to support parties' efforts.¹⁹⁾

International cooperation has also begun, with the European Commission (EC) pledging to launch a 'Just Transition Mechanism' in 2020 to raise 55 billion euros over six years, from 2021 to 2027. The mechanism will provide assistance to mitigate the impact of the transition in the regions most affected by the transition. Under the Mechanism, the 'Just Transition Platform' has been established to provide all information, necessary technical assistance and advice, and best practices related to the transition, including funding, regulatory updates, and sector-specific initiatives.²⁰⁾

The following year, at COP26 in Glasgow, United Kingdom, in 2021, the International Partners Group (IPG), comprised of France, Germany, the UK, the US, and the European Union, launched the Just Energy Transition Partnerships for South Africa. Japan was not a member of the initial IPG until July 2022, when it was expanded to include Indonesia, Vietnam, and Senegal at the G7 Summit in Elmau, Bavaria, Germany. Japan, along with the US, led the consultations for Indonesia, and on November 15, 2022, a joint statement on the Indonesia JETP (hereafter I-JETP) was agreed upon, and on December 14 of the same year, partner countries, including Japan, agreed on a political declaration for the Vietnam JETP (hereafter V-JETP).²¹⁾

19) UNFCCC, "Just Transition of the Workforce, and the Creation of Decent Work and Quality Jobs," April 21, 2020, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Just%20transition_for%20posting.pdf (Accessed April 13, 2024).

20) European Commission, "The Just Transition Mechanism: Making Sure No One Is Left Behind," https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/finance-and-green-deal/just-transition-mechanism_en (Accessed November 23, 2023).

21) 外務省, 『開発協力白書—日本の国際協力(2021年度版)』(東京: 外務省, 2022), p. 77.

1. I-JETP

A joint statement issued by the Indonesian government and the IPG, which includes Japan, the US, Canada, Denmark, the European Union, Germany, France, Norway, Italy, and the United Kingdom reiterates the urgency of tackling climate change in order to achieve the 1.5°C limit set by the Paris Agreement and recognizes that so-called ESG (Environment, Social, and Governance) principles are critical to achieving this goal. It also states that the parties recognize ‘the importance of a just energy transition that brings about opportunities for industrial innovation to create quality green jobs, and considers all communities and societal groups affected directly or indirectly by an expedited reduction of power sector emissions— through early retirement of coal-fired power plants—including women, youth, and others vulnerable to the transition; and that there are several important sectors of Indonesia’s economy that are impacted by such a transition.’²²⁾

I-JETP aims to reduce emissions from Indonesia’s power sector to 290Mt by 2030 and to achieve carbon neutrality of its power sector by 2050. The goal is to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 in all other sectors as well. This is the first time for Indonesia to set a peak-out target. It is seven years ahead of the previous forecast. The means to achieve this goal include expansion of renewable energy, phase-out of on-grid and off-grid coal-fired power generation, and further commitments to regulatory reform and energy conservation. In terms of funding, the first phase of the project will mobilize USD 20 billion (about JPY 2.8 trillion)

22) MOFA, “Joint Statement by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia (GOI) and the Governments of Japan, the United States of America, Canada, Denmark, the European Union, the Federal Republic of Germany, the French Republic, Norway, the Republic of Italy, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,” November 15, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press1e_000344.html (Accessed November 23, 2023).

over the next three to five years. Of the USD 20 billion, USD 10 billion will be provided by the IPG. The EU and its member countries will contribute USD 2.5 billion of that amount.

On November 14, the Indonesian government signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the operator of the 660 MW Leborg No. 1 thermal power plant to decommission the plant through the Energy Transition Mechanism (ETM), which is being implemented in cooperation with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Furthermore, according to the Ministry of Finance of Indonesia, it has already decided to decommission 15 GW of coal-fired power plants in total at an early date and has completed the selection of power plants to be decommissioned. ETM is a blended finance-type program aimed at decommissioning existing coal-fired power plants ahead of schedule and replacing them with clean power generation facilities, and was established by the ADB in 2021, with programs already under consideration in the Philippines and Vietnam.²³⁾ On the sidelines of the G20 Leaders' Summit in Bali held in 2022, ADB also signed a MOU with key partners of Indonesia to jointly explore the early retirement of the first coal-fired power plant owned by an independent power producer under ADB's ETM, which aims for open detailed discussions to accelerate the retirement of Cirebon-1, a 660-megawatt plant owned by Cirebon Electric Power (CEP) in West Java.²⁴⁾

23) Sustainable Japan, “【国際】日米欧、インドネシアの脱炭素化に2.8兆円資金動員。石炭火力15GW廃止、2030年再エネ34%,” 2022年11月16日, <https://sustainablejapan.jp/2022/11/16/indonesia-energy-transition/79198> (Accessed November 23, 2023).

24) Asian Development Bank, “ADB and Indonesia Partners Sign Landmark MOU on Early Retirement Plan for First Coal Power Plant Under Energy Transition Mechanism,” November 14, 2022, <https://www.adb.org/news/adb-and-indonesia-partners-sign-landmark-mou-early-retirement-plan-first-coal-power-plant> (Accessed November 23, 2023).

2. V-JETP

The political declaration between the Vietnamese government and the IPG also states that the parties emphasize “that for this transition to be just, equitable and inclusive for consumers, workers and affected communities, efforts will be needed to ensure that all are adequately protected from the direct risks and can benefit from opportunities brought by this transition, so that no one is left behind.” It also notes that “the transition should be accompanied by programmes of training and retraining, upskilling, job creation and other forms of support for workers in the affected sectors and areas, so that they can benefit from the industrial innovation and the creation of quality green jobs” and that “access to electricity must remain affordable and reliable for all, in particular for affected, vulnerable and low income groups”, reflecting the concept of a just transition.²⁵⁾

Meanwhile, Vietnam aims to promote the development of renewable energy and the efficient use of energy to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, with the goal of successfully implementing V-JETP. On August 31, 2023, Deputy Prime Minister Tran Hong Ha signed Decision 1009/QĐ-TTg, approving the implementation plan on JETP. This initiative will maximize support from international partners and promote Vietnam’s Energy Development Strategy, Vietnam’s 8th National Power Development Plan (PDP8) and NDC through technology transfer, human resource development, and financing, in order to move away from coal-fired power generation and fossil fuels, and to promote green energy. Vietnam intends to establish a legal system to promote energy transition by 2030 and to strengthen the spread of renewable energy.

25) MOFA, “Political Declaration on establishing the Just Energy Transition Partnership with Viet Nam,” December 15, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/ic/ch/page1_001450.html (Accessed November 23, 2023).

The project aims to reduce CO₂ emissions and promote the production of hydrogen and ammonia. It also aims to increase the ratio of renewable energy to 85% by 2050.²⁶⁾ V-JETP is expected to disburse an initial USD 15.5 billion over the next 3-5 years to support Vietnam's green transition.²⁷⁾

IV. Internal and External Assessment on Japan's Involvement on JETP

In this chapter, assessments of Japan's participation in JETP from within and outside Japan will be examined, and policy implications for the future will be drawn. The reason why this chapter examines both internal and external evaluations is that Japan is a liberal democracy, and as such, the government not only needs to be concerned with domestic public opinion and the reactions of civil society organizations, but as one of the richest countries in the world and a developed nation that has consistently emphasized the UN SDGs, it also needs to be evaluated by the international community.

1. I-JETP

According to JICA's data, a total of 37 ODA projects between Indonesia and Japan were related to the energy/mining sector (See <Table 1>). The oldest project was in 1989, when the Japanese government provided a

26) VietBiz, "ベトナムの石炭火力からの脱却: JETPの実施計画と具体的目標," 2023年9月14日, <https://vietbiz.jp/239-14-breakingnews-vn/> (Accessed November 23, 2023).

27) VietJo, "日本など支援の「公正なエネルギー移行パートナーシップ」、首相が実施計画を承認," 2023年9月5日, <https://www.viet-jo.com/news/social/230905172256.html> (Accessed November 25, 2023).

loan of about JPY 800 million. The projects included building new factories, replacing machinery, and providing operational guidance to a power generation equipment repair center owned by Indonesia's state-owned electricity company, Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN), and JICA claims that these projects have contributed to the stable supply of electricity and economic growth in Indonesia.²⁸⁾

Since then, Japan has continued to provide ODA mostly in the form of loan agreements to supplement power plants or parts of the grid system, with a total of three grant-type aid projects out of 37 energy-related projects, many of which were related to thermal power plants. The first was the 'Gresik Thermal Power Station Units 1 and 2 Improvement Plan (Phase 1)', which began in March 1999 and provided approximately 1.2 billion yen. The second one was again 'Gresik Thermal Power Station Units 1 and 2 Improvement Plan (Phase 2)', which began in July of the same year, with an additional JPY 1.13 billion. The Gresik Thermal Power Plant Units 1 and 2 in Indonesia were constructed in the 1970s with Japanese yen loans, but the aging of the facilities had become a problem. In addition, in order to reduce operating costs and environmental impact, the plant had been independently modified to use natural gas as fuel in addition to oil, but due to financial difficulties, the construction work was suspended and the power output was about 60% of the design value. Through the above cooperation (Phase 1-2), Japan provided support for equipment modification and gasification modification work. As a result, the maximum output recovered to 93-96%, contributing to the improvement of the environment, according to JICA's explanation. The third case of grant aid is the 'Gresik Thermal Power Station Units 3 and 4 Renovation Plan', which has been underway since 2004, and for which Japan has provided approximately

28) JICA, "ODA見える化サイト".

JPY 2 billion.²⁹⁾

The Japanese government, which has a history of supporting coal-fired power plants in developing countries including Indonesia as explained above, built an infrastructure export plan in 2020 that was met with opposition from environmental groups. The Japanese government decided on the framework for the next infrastructure system export strategy, and while in principle it will not provide public support for overseas coal-fired power generation in countries that have yet to confirm their transition to decarbonization, it has decided to continue to provide support for high-efficiency projects as an exception. In a press conference, Koizumi Junichiro, then Minister of Environment, also stated that the decision will make it more difficult to export coal-fired power generation projects in the future. Japanese environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs), who have been calling for the suspension of public support for overseas coal-fired power generation projects, expressed their opposition by saying that the government has not made a clear decision to discontinue public support and that it continues without applying it to ongoing cases.³⁰⁾

Ahead of the Japan-Indonesia summit held on October 20, 2020, eight citizens' groups from Japan and Indonesia submitted a letter of request to the two governments on October 19, calling for the cancellation of the Indramayu coal-fired power plant expansion project (1 million kW), which JICA was trying to continue to support.³¹⁾ Japanese environmental

29) JICA, “ODA見える化サイト”.

30) Friends of the Earth Japan, “【NGO共同声明】政府の新骨子「原則支援しない」と盛り込むもパリ協定と依然矛盾～海外石炭火力は進行中案件も含めて支援中止を～,” 2020年7月9日, <https://foejapan.org/issue/20200709/4156/> (Accessed November 25, 2023).

31) Friends of the Earth Japan, “Indonesian and Japanese NGOs call on both governments to stop the Indramayu Coal-fired Power Plant Expansion Project, West Java, Indonesia,” October 19, 2020, <https://foejapan.org/en/issue/20201019/2777/> (Accessed November 25, 2023).

organizations continued to press the Japanese government through joint statements. In June 2021, they released the 'Joint Statement: Japan must not be allowed to violate the G7 Leaders' Statement - Supporting new Coal Plants in Indonesia and Bangladesh goes against the Agreement.'³²⁾ After all, MOFA announced on June 22, 2022, that it will suspend ODA for Indramayu in Indonesia, together with the Matabali 2 coal-fired power generation projects in Bangladesh. The decision was interpreted to be aimed at fending off increasing pressure on Japan, the only G7 country that had adopted a policy of continuing coal-fired power generation projects at home and abroad, ahead of the G7 summit which was scheduled to be held in Bali, Indonesia.³³⁾

This process led to Japan joining I-JETP in November 2022, so the Japanese government documentation emphasizes that Japan is a member of the G7, a member of the G20 (which also includes Indonesia), and a country that values cooperation with international organizations and seeks to fulfill its international responsibilities.³⁴⁾

According to the Memorandum of Cooperation signed between the Indonesian and the Japanese governments in January 2022, cooperation on hydrogen, fuel ammonia, and Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)/Carbon Capture Utilization and Storage (CCUS) was emphasized as technologies to achieve 'realistic energy transitions.' In addition, JICA commissioned Japanese companies such as TEPCO Power Grid, Inc.

32) JACSES, "Joint Statement: Japan must not be allowed to violate the G7 Leaders' Statement - Supporting new Coal Plants in Indonesia and Bangladesh goes against the Agreement -," June 29, 2021, <http://jacses.org/en/238/> (Accessed November 25, 2023).

33) 環境金融研究機構, "外務省、バングラデシュ・マタバリ、インドネシア・インドラマユの両石炭火力発電事業への政府開発援助 (ODA) 支援中止を発表。週末のG7サミットを控え、日本への批判回避を目指す," 2022年6月23日, <https://rief-jp.org/ct5/126006/> (Accessed November 25, 2023).

34) 外務省, 『開発協力白書 (2022年度版)』, (東京: 外務省, 2022), pp. 76-78; 環境省, "目指すべき持続可能な社会を実現するための方向性について (国際関係) - 第六次環境基本計画に向けた基本的事項に関する検討会 第3回," (環境省, 2023), pp. 3-4.

(TEPCO PG), Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc. (TEPCO HD), JERA Co., Inc. (JERA), Tokyo Electric Power Services Co., Ltd (TEPSCO) to complete the 'Data Collection Survey on Power Sector in Indonesia for Decarbonization' in March 2022.

The study report presents a roadmap for achieving carbon neutrality by 2060 and proposes the following three priority support measures: (1) Feasibility Studies (FS) and demonstration test for ammonia co-firing at coal-fired power plants, (2) FS and demonstration test for biomass co-firing at coal-fired power plants, and (3) support for institutional design for promotion of co-firing at coal-fired power plants. As a long-term direction, the above report also includes the following: (1) hydrogen thermal power (assuming dependence on imported gas for hydrogen) to be account for a large proportion of the power source mix after 2051, and (2) ammonia, hydrogen and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) (with CCS) as the three main fuels.³⁵⁾

Consequently speaking, however, environmental groups in Japan and Indonesia are now arguing that these technologies are the 'false' policy for decarbonization in Indonesia. They argue that the Japanese government's policy direction, which should be to replace fossil fuels with renewable energy and pursue a fair transition, is not desirable at all because it either condones the continued use of fossil fuels with CCS/CCUS or simply replaces one fossil fuel with another.³⁶⁾

35) Friends of the Earth Japan, "Indonesian CSOs Submit a Petition to the Japanese Government: "No more prolonging the lifespan of fossil fuel and destroying the environment and livelihoods in Indonesia in the name of a 'Just Energy Transition'," November 1, 2022, <https://foejapan.org/en/issue/20221101/10064/> (Accessed November 25, 2023).

36) Friends of the Earth Japan, (2022); ドウイ・サウン, "インドネシアにおける脱炭素政策と日本による支援の問題," The Indonesian Forum for the Environment (WALHI): 2023.02.03.

2. V-JETP

Meanwhile, in Vietnam, according to JICA's data, there were 40 energy-related ODA projects (See <Table 2>). As in Indonesia, thermal power plants are one of the most important projects, and the oldest project is the Phu My Thermal Power Plant Project, which cost about JPY 48.4 billion in credit assistance from 1994 to 1995. In Vietnam, the supply and demand of electricity has been tightening in line with economic development, especially in the southern region, where electricity consumption has been increasing and further growth in electricity demand was predicted. In the first phase of this cooperation, Japan supported the construction of a gas combined cycle thermal power plant that reuses waste heat and a related transmission line and substation in Phu My, a district near Ho Chi Minh City. After the project was implemented, the Phu My thermal power plant was responsible for supplying approximately 21% of the total electricity generated in the southern part of the country (approximately 11% of the total electricity generated nationwide), contributing to meeting increasing electricity demand, ensuring a stable supply of electricity, and revitalizing the economy of the southern region, according to JICA's explanation.³⁷⁾ Other projects have been mainly related to thermal power generation and power grids, such as the Omong Thermal Power Plant and Mekong Delta Transmission Network Project, Guisong Thermal Power Plant Construction Project, and Taibin Power Plant and Transmission Lines Project.

V-JETP's implementation plan has only recently been approved by the Vietnamese government, as mentioned above, but concerns have been raised by civil groups, and they are calling for a moratorium on

37) JICA, "ODA見える化サイト".

it. Activists say this is because the Vietnamese government is stepping up repression of environmental experts, threatening their efforts to help the energy transition.

The purpose of V-JETP is to help the country move away from its dependence on coal-fired power, which has an impact on climate change. V-JETP stresses the importance of constant consultation with the media, society, and NGOs. However, in September 2023, Hanoi police detained Ngo Thi To Nhien, Executive Director of the Vietnam Initiative for Energy Transition (VIET), an independent think tank focused on green energy policy. According to media reports, Nien is suspected of 'illegally obtaining documents' related to state-owned power projects.³⁸⁾ Maureen Harris, Senior Advisor at International Rivers, a U.S.-based nonprofit organization, said the above event has made donor countries very hesitant to participate in V-JETP. She pointed out that there is a need to clarify policies on the protection of those involved before going any further among stakeholders including power utility companies.³⁹⁾ Japanese NGOs echo these concerns.

3. Overall Assessment

As explained above, there are some issues with both I-JETP and V-JETP. While the problems of both projects seem to be different, it can also be said that they have a common problem of establishing a relationship with civil society. In particular, Japan, as mentioned earlier, started its development cooperation projects to compensate the countries it damaged during World War II and has treated it as an

38) Michael Taylor, “アングル：環境専門家の拘束相次ぐベトナム、再生エネ協定に懸念も,” *Reuters*, 2023年10月30日, <https://www.reuters.com/article/vietnam-climate-energy-idJPKBN31R0DA/> (Accessed November 25, 2023).

39) Taylor (2023).

important tool in its foreign policy, so it has strategically operated its ODA in a way that maximizes its own national interests. While Japan has long been one of the largest donors in Southeast Asia, its position in the region is shrinking due to China's rapid rise, massive financial resources, and BRI. Moreover, China's foreign aid strategy overlaps with Japan's development cooperation policy, especially in Southeast Asia, and Japan is facing increasing policy challenges to better utilize its limited resources and manpower for development cooperation.⁴⁰⁾

As the only Asian country to be a member of the G7, and as an extension of the UN-centrism and SDGs it has always valued, Japan joined JETPs. However, it has also been criticized because it seems to be more focused on exporting its own technology, which does not necessarily contribute to 'just energy transition.' Looking at Japan's 'Green Growth Strategy Through Achieving Carbon Neutrality in 2050,' outlined by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) and finally accepted in 2021, Lim pointed out that Japan's so-called green technology-related policies are prioritizing not only promoting technology development, but also spreading the technology overseas and making it an international standard.⁴¹⁾ The strategy specifies the following 14 promising fields that are expected to grow: (1) offshore wind power, solar, and heat energy, (2) hydrogen, fuel ammonia, (3) next generation heat energy, (4) nuclear power, (5) automobile, storage batteries, (6) semiconductors, information/communication, (7) shipping, (8) logistics, people flow, civil engineering, (9) food, agriculture, fishery, forestry, (10) aircraft, (11) carbon recycling, materials, (12) housing/building, next generation electric power management, (13) resource circulation, and (14) lifestyle related.⁴²⁾

40) 임은정(2021), p. 10.

41) 임은정, "제8장 기후변화 대응의 한·일 비교: 녹색기술 관련 정책을 중심으로," 이태동 편, 『기후변화와 정치경제: 국제통상, 기업, 기술』(서울: 박영사, 2023), pp. 238-262.

42) METI, "Green Growth Strategy through Achieving Carbon Neutrality in 2050," October,

Japan appears to be prioritizing the further promotion and dissemination of its own technological developments through ODA projects, and this behavior has led to clashes with civil society communities in recipient countries and at home.

On the other hand, there is a growing consensus in Japan that the country's past experience offers lessons for a just transition. Japan once experienced an energy transition from coal to oil in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and it has a case of 'scrap and build' in the coal mining industry. In the roughly 40 years from the 1960s to the 2000s, 928 coal mines closed in Japan, and more than 200,000 workers were displaced from the industry. The Japanese government spent a total of JPY 4 trillion in fiscal funds for various policy measures to support this transition. The initial policy focused on absorbing displaced workers through job training and the creation of jobs in other industries. The later policy was to provide direct benefits to displaced workers and implement direct benefits to job leavers. The government agency, the Employment Promotion Agency (雇用促進事業団), and local government departments, coal companies and their labor unions worked together to address the unemployment problem, and to provide benefits to those who had closed their jobs.⁴³⁾ Therefore, it is argued that these experiences should be used to deepen the discussion on a justice transition in other countries.

17, 2022, https://www.meti.go.jp/english/policy/energy_environment/global_warming/ggs2050/index.html (Accessed November 29, 2023).

43) 気候ネットワーク, 『公正な移行—脱炭素社会へ、新しい仕事と雇用をつくりだす—』(2021年9月), p. 11; 桃井貴子, “公正な移行~気候危機解決の重要な視点,” 『グローバルネット』(2022年7月号), <https://www.gef.or.jp/globalnet202207/globalnet202207-2/> (Accessed November 25, 2023).

V. Conclusion

The following implications can be drawn from the Japanese case discussed in this article. First, Japan has embraced the SDGs within the framework of its larger foreign policy, namely internationalism and UN-centrism, and by extension, the concept of a just transition. Second, Japan's participation in JETP can be seen as an attempt to align itself with the leadership of liberal countries, namely the G7. In short, rather than voluntarily accepting and promoting just transition or JETP, it would be fair to say that Japan is reacting to international trends. Japan's characterization as a 'reactive state'⁴⁴⁾ can also be observed in its response to the climate crisis, such as a just transition and JETP.

At COP28 in Dubai, Japan's Prime Minister Kishida Fumio declared that the country would not build any new coal-fired power plants overseas.⁴⁵⁾ This decision is also a response to the criticism Japan has been receiving. However, Japan's domestic reliance on coal-fired power generation is still very large, and the country has not committed to shutting down all of its ongoing projects, so it will be academically intriguing to keep watching how Japan will accelerate its energy transition and a just transition both domestically and internationally while participating in programs like JETP.

On the other hand, the problems with Japan's participation in JETP so far can be summarized as follows. First, even if a project is carried out by agreement between the donor and the recipient governments, the question remains whether it can be supported by society as a whole.

44) Kent E. Calder, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State," *World Politics*, Vol. 40, No.4 (1988), pp. 517-542.

45) *Reuters*, "Japan to stop building unabated coal power plants, PM Kishida tells COP28," December 1, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japan-stop-building-unabated-coal-power-plants-pm-kishida-tells-cop28-2023-12-01/> (Accessed April 13, 2024).

If a just transition is about seeking a more inclusive consensus, the findings of this article suggest that it would be desirable to ensure that the voices of civil society and a wider range of actors are heard even at the project decision-making stage. If a project is not supported by civil society during its implementation or even after it is finalized, it may end up being another greenwashing controversy in the name of a just transition. It is really a governance issue that comes down to what kind of relationship the donor and/or the recipient country's government want(s) to have with their civil society groups.

The second issue is how to achieve a harmonious outcome between the commercial interests of donor countries and a just transition in recipient countries. As we can see from the cases discussed in this paper, the JETP projects are also regarded as a strategic and technology diffusion project for Japan, so there may be a limit to the support of civil society. Of course, ODA is composed of taxes from the citizens of the donor country, so it is natural that it should benefit the national interests of the donor country as well as the recipient country, but I think it is important to have a more inclusive decision-making process in order to find projects that can benefit both donor and recipient countries while realizing higher-level values such as a just transition.

<Table 1> List of Resource and Energy-related ODA Projects Provided by Japan to Indonesia*

(Unit: JPY Billion)

Project	Agreement	Total Amount	Type
Diacolot Power Generation Equipment Repair Center Restoration Project	Dec-89	0.793	Loan Agreement
Biribiri Multi-purpose Dam Construction Project (1)	Dec-90	6.662	Loan Agreement
Kota Panjang hydroelectric power generation and related transmission line construction project (1)	Dec-90	12.500	Loan Agreement
Lunung hydroelectric power generation and related transmission line construction project (1)	Sep-91	5.460	Loan Agreement
Kota Panjang hydroelectric power generation and related transmission line construction project (2)	Sep-91	17.525	Loan Agreement
Biribiri Multi-purpose Dam Construction Project (2)	Oct-92	20.798	Loan Agreement
Lunung hydroelectric power generation and related transmission line construction project (2)	Nov-93	15.668	Loan Agreement
Lunung hydroelectric power generation and related transmission line construction project (3)	Nov-94	5.479	Loan Agreement
Biribiri Multi-purpose Dam Construction Project (3)	Nov-94	3.488	Loan Agreement
Banjarmasin coal-fired power plant construction Project	Nov-94	6.464	Loan Agreement
Java-Bali Grid Backbone Transmission Line Construction Project (1)	Dec-95	17.037	Loan Agreement
Sipansihapolas hydroelectric power plant and related transmission line construction project	Dec-95	2.978	Loan Agreement
Multipurpose dam power generation Project	Dec-96	6.291	Loan Agreement
Rural electrification projects (2)	Dec-96	6.115	Loan Agreement
Java-Bali Grid Backbone Transmission Line Construction Project (2)	Dec-96	2.840	Loan Agreement
Sipansihapolas hydropower project (2)	Dec-96	8.408	Loan Agreement
Tarahan Coal-Fired Power Project	Jan-98	34.023	Loan Agreement
Java-Bali Grid Backbone Transmission Line Construction Project (3)	Jan-98	10.918	Loan Agreement

* Fossil fuel-related projects are in bold.

Project	Agreement	Total Amount	Type
Gresik Thermal Power Station Units 1 and 2 Improvement Plan (Phase 1)	Mar-99	1.182	Exchange of Note
Gresik Thermal Power Station Units 1 and 2 Improvement Plan (Phase 2)	Jul-99	1.134	Exchange of Note
South Sumatra-West Java Gas Pipeline Construction Project	Mar-03	49.088	Loan Agreement
Muara Tawar gas-fired power plant expansion project	Jul-03	18.182	Loan Agreement
Muara Karang Thermal Power Plant Gasification Project	Jul-03	55.750	Loan Agreement
Lahendong Geothermal Power Plant Expansion Project	Mar-04	5.866	Loan Agreement
Tanjung Priok Thermal Power Plant Expansion Project	Mar-04	58.679	Loan Agreement
Gresik Thermal Power Station Units 3 and 4 Renovation Plan	Jul-04	1.985	Exchange of Note
Kramasan Thermal Power Plant Expansion Project	Mar-05	9.736	Loan Agreement
Ulubulu Geothermal Power Plant Construction Project	Mar-05	20.288	Loan Agreement
Northwest Sumatra Interconnection Transmission Line Construction Project	Mar-07	16.119	Loan Agreement
Rumutbalai Geothermal Power Project	Mar-11	26.966	Loan Agreement
Integrated biorefinery research center construction project	Nov-13 ~ Oct-18		Technical Cooperation
Fluid catalytic cracking gasification of biomass waste and liquid fuel production model system development project	Apr-14 ~ Mar-19		Technical Cooperation
Mid- to long-term promotion system design support project for geothermal development	Sep-14 ~ Aug-18		Technical Cooperation
Technology development project for steam spot detection and sustainable resource use aimed at significantly promoting geothermal power generation in Indonesia	Apr-15 ~ Apr-20		Technical Cooperation
Java-Sumatra Interconnected Transmission Line Project (2)	Dec-15	62.914	Loan Agreement
Mid- to long-term promotion system design support project for geothermal development Phase 2	Oct-20 ~ Sep-23		Technical Cooperation
Pusangan Hydroelectric Power Plant Construction Project (Phase II)	Mar-23	13.62	Loan Agreement

Source: JICA, "ODA見える化サイト".

<Table 2> List of Resource and Energy-related ODA Projects Provided by Japan to Vietnam*

(Unit: JPY Billion)

Project	Agreement	Total Amount	Type
Phu My Thermal Power Plant Construction Project (1)	Jan-94	26.942	Loan Agreement
Phu My Thermal Power Plant Construction Project (2)	Apr-95	10.262	Loan Agreement
Far Rai Thermal Power Plant Expansion Project (1)	Apr-95	11.057	Loan Agreement
Hamtoan Dhammy Hydroelectric Power Plant Construction Project (1)	Apr-95	17.092	Loan Agreement
Far Rai Thermal Power Plant Expansion Project (2)	Mar-96	20.000	Loan Agreement
Hamtoan Dhammy Hydroelectric Power Plant Construction Project (2)	Mar-96	4.962	Loan Agreement
Phu My thermal power plant construction project (3)	Mar-97	11.638	Loan Agreement
Far Rai Thermal Power Plant Expansion Project (3)	Mar-97	32.529	Loan Agreement
Hamtoan Dhammy Hydroelectric Power Plant Construction Project (3)	Mar-97	4.664	Loan Agreement
Danim power system renovation Project	Mar-97	7.000	Loan Agreement
Hamtoan Dhammy Hydroelectric Power Plant Construction Project (4)	Mar-98	24.893	Loan Agreement
Phu My thermal power plant construction project (4)	Mar-99	13.090	Loan Agreement
Far Rai Thermal Power Plant Expansion Project (4)	Mar-99	8.510	Loan Agreement
Dainin Hydroelectric Power Plant Construction Project (1)	Mar-99	4.030	Loan Agreement
Phu My - Ho Chi Minh City 500kV transmission line construction Project	Mar-01	13.127	Loan Agreement
Dainin Hydroelectric Power Plant Construction Project (2)	Mar-01	10.000	Loan Agreement
Omong Thermal Power Plant Mekong Delta Transmission and Substation Network Construction Project (1)	Mar-01	5.900	Loan Agreement

* Fossil fuel-related projects are in bold.

Project	Agreement	Total Amount	Type
Omong Thermal Power Plant Mekong Delta Transmission and Substation Network Construction Project (2)	Mar-02	15.594	Loan Agreement
Omong Thermal Power Plant Mekong Delta Transmission and Substation Network Construction Project (3)	Mar-03	21.689	Loan Agreement
Environment Management system construction support loan	Mar-04	3.190	Loan Agreement
Dainin Hydroelectric Power Plant Construction Project (3)	Mar-04	19.142	Loan Agreement
Takumo Hydroelectric Power Plant Expansion Project	Mar-04	5.972	Loan Agreement
Omong Thermal Power Plant Unit 2 Construction Project	Mar-04	27.547	Loan Agreement
Guisong Thermal Power Plant Construction Project (1)	Mar-07	20.943	Loan Agreement
Omong Thermal Power Plant Mekong Delta Transmission and Substation Network Construction Project (4)	Mar-07	9.364	Loan Agreement
Transmission and Distribution Network Improvement Project	Mar-08	10.906	Loan Agreement
Fusion of sustainable local agriculture and biomass industry	Oct-09 ~ Oct-14		Technical Cooperation
Energy conservation and renewable energy promotion projects	Nov-09	4.682	Loan Agreement
Taibin Thermal Power Plant and Transmission Line Construction Project (1)	Nov-09	20.737	Loan Agreement
Power technical standards dissemination project	Mar-10 ~ Jun-13		Loan Agreement
Guisong Thermal Power Plant Construction Project (2)	Jan-11	29.852	Loan Agreement
Guisong Thermal Power Plant Construction Project (3)	Sep-11	40.330	Loan Agreement
Omong Thermal Power Plant Unit 2 Construction Project (2)	Mar-13	6.221	Loan Agreement
Danim Hydroelectric Power Plant Expansion Project	Feb-14	7.515	Loan Agreement
Taibin Thermal Power Plant and Transmission Line Construction Project (2)	Jan-15	36.392	Loan Agreement

Project	Agreement	Total Amount	Type
A project to build a regional energy circulation system that combines high-efficiency fuel cells and recycled biogas	Apr-15 ~ Mar-20		Technical Cooperation
Secondary transmission/substation/distribution network development Project	Jul-15	29.786	Loan Agreement
Taibin Thermal Power Plant and Transmission Line Construction Project (3)	Jul-15	9.873	Loan Agreement
Taibin Thermal Power Plant and Transmission Line Construction Project (4)	May-16	54.982	Loan Agreement
Science and technology innovation project for global carbon cycle process using natural rubber	Feb-23 ~ Oct-23		Technical Cooperation

Source: JICA, "ODA見える化サイト".

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[국문초록]

일본의 개발협력과 '정의로운 전환'

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일본은 제2차 세계대전 당시의 피해를 보상하기 위해 아시아 저개발국에 대규모의 공적개발원조(ODA)를 제공해 왔다는 경위가 있다. 에너지 전환과 기후변화 대응이 일본의 대아시아 ODA에 있어서 주요 의제는 아니었지만, ODA 분야에서도 급부상한 중국과 차별화하기 위해서 점차 ODA 사업의 질적 향상에 관심을 가지게 되었다. 아울러 G7 및 G20 회원국으로서 다른 국가들로부터 받는 평가나 국제사회에서 일본의 위상이 더욱 중요해졌기 때문에 최근 일본의 ODA에서도 기후변화 대응을 위한 에너지 전환과 정의로운 전환을 반영하는 움직임이 나타나고 있다. 인도네시아 및 베트남과의 정의로운 전환을 위한 에너지 파트너십(JETP)은 이러한 최근의 추세를 반영한 것이다. 일본은 그동안 인도네시아와 베트남에 다양한 형태의 에너지 관련 ODA를 제공해왔으며, 그 중 상당수는 화석연료 화력 발전 관련 시설에 대한 것이었지만, 이제 일본은 이 국가들에서도 '정의로운 에너지 전환'이 실현될 수 있도록 계획을 수립하고 있다. 하지만 지금까지의 평가는 마냥 긍정적이지만은 않다. 궁극적으로 이러한 프로젝트가 성공하기 위해서는 사회 내 다양한 주체들의 목소리를 경청하고, 계획 단계부터 쌍방향 토론을 통해 사회적 공감대를 형성해야 한다는 것이 본고가 제안하는 바이다.

주제어: 기후변화, 에너지 전환, 정의로운 전환, 일본의 ODA, JETP

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