The Stable Peace between France and Germany: The Role of the United States✢

Sung Eun Choi* · Iordanka Alexandrova**

|ABSTRACT|

This article sheds light on the crucial role of the United States for the achievement of stable peace between France and Germany after World War II. It argues that Washington helped the two former enemies by creating strategic security incentives for sustained cooperation. First, the United States made its commitment to the defense of Europe against the rising threat from the Soviet Union conditional on defense burden-sharing by France and Germany. The two former adversaries were driven to reconcile because they realized that only by cooperating to compete effectively against the Soviet Union, they could rely on the support of the powerful overseas ally. Second, once cooperation was under way, the United States acted as a guarantor in the process of reconciliation between France and Germany. By remaining engaged in Europe, Washington helped the two states build trust and overcome their mutual concerns over relative gains. As a result, the two former rivals were able to achieve a state of stable peace, excluding the use of military power as a tool for resolving conflict between them.

Ⅰ. Introduction

What made possible the stabilization of relations between Germany and France—two enemies bitter from the experience of a series of devastating wars? The century-long rivalry between the two strategic opponents formally ended with a peace agreement concluded soon after the end of World War II. On October 23, 1954, following conferences in London and Paris, France became a signatory to the Paris Accords endorsing the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to the Brussels Treaty. The agreements terminated the occupation of West Germany returning its sovereignty and the right to rearm. They further welcomed the FRG in the newly established regional security alliance—the Western European Union and recommended its inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Despite these agreements, the peace between France and Germany was not expected to last just as it had not persisted after the Franco-Prussian War and World War I. Suspicion and mistrust marred relations between the two former rivals. A victim of German expansionism in World War II, France remained deeply concerned about future aggression from its powerful neighbor. In 1956, as much as 66 percent of the French public still had little or no confidence in Germany's future behavior.[1] Much of the leadership continued to be fearful of a revived and rearmed Germany. In 1954, the plan for a European Defense Community (EDC) with an army comprising German units was rejected by the French National Assembly. Its President, Edouard Herriot, speaking for those who dreaded German rearmament stated that France "was not so sure

---

1) Jennifer Lind, *Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), p. 117.

the Federal Republic would respect her signed obligations."[2] On their side, many in Germany mistrusted France and were greatly alarmed by French attempts to maintain economic control over the industrial Saarland.[3]

Against the odds, France and Germany achieved stable peace. Not once since 1954 have the two countries used military force against each other. More importantly, there is no evidence of them considering the option, or ever designating each other as a potential enemy.[4] The two former adversaries faithfully implemented the 1954 peace agreements without any attempts to denounce or revise them. France and Germany worked to eliminate conflict in their economic policies, coordinated production, and developed commercial exchanges as stipulated in the Brussels Treaty. They did not conclude alliances or participate in coalitions against one another. All disputes were settled by peaceful means by referring them to court when needed. For example, the Saar, which had been occupied by the Allies and then became a French protectorate, was peacefully returned to Germany with the Luxembourg Agreements of 1956.

We argue that the United States played a crucial role in the building of stable peace between France and Germany by creating strategic security incentives for sustained cooperation. The first incentive was

---

2) Robert McGeehan, *The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense after World War II* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971), p. 211, quoted in ibid., p. 118.

3) Donald Puchala, "Integration and Disintegration in Franco-German Relations, 1954-1965," *International Organization*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Spring 1970), pp. 188-191; F. Roy Willis, *France, Germany, and the New Europe: 1945-1967* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 70-76.

4) Robert Art, "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Spring, 1991), p. 46; Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), p. 9.

that the United States made its military engagement in Europe conditional on burden-sharing by the Western European powers. After the end of World War II, Western Europeans needed to secure U.S. commitment to the defense of the continent against the rising threat from the Soviet Union. Washington offered security guarantees to France and West Germany while demanding that they share the burden for their common defense. The two European nations were driven to reconcile by their realization that only by cooperating to compete effectively against the Soviet Union, they could rely on the support of the powerful overseas ally.

The second incentive was that the United States took the role of a guarantor in the process of reconciliation between France and Germany. To maintain close cooperation needed to stay level with Moscow, Paris and Bonn had to overcome deep-entrenched concerns about cheating and asymmetric distribution of gains. By remaining in Europe, Washington helped to reduce these mutual concerns, allowing France and Germany to sustain cooperation. As a result, the two former adversaries could engage in efforts to build trust and develop institutional solutions to problems of distribution, which over time resulted in deep interdependence making the use of force as a tool of foreign policy an unavailable option for the former adversaries.

Understanding the dynamics conductive to the emergence of stable peace between states locked in prolonged geopolitical competition has clear practical significance. The findings of this article suggest that it is possible for external security commitments to help sustain cooperation between rivals. If the diplomatic efforts of leaders seeking to reconcile relations with former enemies are insufficient to overcome mutual mistrust, common allies may use their leverage as security partners at the initial stages of rapprochement

to increase their chances of success. For example, South and North Korea are currently discussing a potential peace regime seeking to replace the Armistice Agreement signed after the Korean War with a peace treaty. This study provides insights that can contribute to the successful conclusion of this effort. Specifically, it highlights, first, the importance of recognizing the shared strategic interests between the two rivals on the Korean Peninsula to overcome issues of mutual mistrust and concerns about relative gains and, second, the option of relying on a common ally to provide an incentive for cooperation.

Past research has provided many important insights for understanding stable peace and the roles of international institutions, leadership, and domestic actors in shaping cooperative outcomes.[5] The significance of ideas of supra-nationalism and economic self-interest has also been studied in depth.[6] Key works further establish that the initial reconciliation between former enemies is driven primarily by balance of power considerations.[7] However, with a few exceptions most of the recent scholarship on the topic has disproportionately focused on the incentives for cooperation provided by adversaries.[8] Certainly, the role of the United States as an active promotor of European integration has been duly acknowledged.[9] Nevertheless,

---

5) G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Charles Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Norrin Ripsman, *Peacemaking from Above, Peace from Below: Ending Conflict between Regional Rivals* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016).

6) Craig Parsons, *A Certain Idea of Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).

7) Joseph Parent, *Uniting States: Voluntary Union in World Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Sebastian Rosato, *Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010).

8) See Geir Lundestad, *"Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

considerations related to alliance dynamics, and specifically to managing the risk of abandonment by a common ally has received less attention. In order to address this gap, we first focus on identifying the strategic incentives for cooperation created by the United States as a common ally of France and Germany in the post-war period. Second, we examine the extent to which U.S. incentives helped maintain stable cooperation.

The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In the next section we present a conceptual framework defining the core elements of stable peace and the path to its achievement. Next, we discuss the role of the United States in creating the incentives that pushed France and West Germany to cooperate. In the following section, we trace the process of deepening of cooperation, which ultimately led to demilitarization of relations between the two former adversaries. We conclude by offering some implications for peace negotiations in the aftermath of major conflict.

II. Stable Peace: Definition and Determinants

This article adopts the definition of stable peace as a relationship "in which neither side considers employing force, or even making a threat of force, in any dispute, even serious disputes, between them." Thus, stable peace can be distinguished from other two types of cooperation where military force continues to be a policy

---

9) Hans Binnendjik and Richard Kugler, "Transform NATO: Don't End It," *The National Interest*, Vol. 75 (2004); Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 54 (1984); Peter Katzenstein, *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium*(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); A. W. Lovett, "The United States and the Schuman Plan. A Study in French Diplomacy 1950-1952," *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (June 1996), pp. 425-455.

instrument: precarious peace – a "temporary absence of armed conflict" between adversaries, and conditional peace, which is preserved only by deterrence by one or both sides.[10]

It follows that to achieve stable peace states need to reach a mutual understanding that all disputes between them will be dealt with by nonmilitary means. This is a challenging task. States find it difficult to sustain cooperation due to concerns about relative gains and persistent fear of cheating.[11] Each worries that the other side might disproportionally benefit from cooperation and later resort to use of force to improve its own relative position or to achieve dominance.[12] In the case of former war enemies, the concern of cheating is intensified as the experience of armed conflict makes it more difficult to overcome mutual feelings of animosity and mistrust. As a result, each of them has to put in extra effort to reassure the other that it will not exploit the peacetime to gain an advantage, which would allow it to threaten the survival of the party that pursued a cooperative strategy. Such issues notwithstanding, states can cooperate providing that they find a way to shed their mutual apprehensions. While this is unlikely between states whose interests are fundamentally conflictual, sometimes even geopolitical rivals have strong incentives to maintain peaceful relations for a prolonged period.

What strategic considerations can induce sufficient effort to sustain cooperation between long-standing rivals? Incentives

---

10) Alexander George, *On Foreign Policy: Unfinished Business*(London: Routledge, 2006), p. 55.

11) John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), p. 51.

12) Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988).

strong enough to push states to build mutual trust and work to overcome concerns about relative gains are created by common threats. States facing a superior competitor, which they can defeat only by combining their capabilities have an imperative to cooperate to balance against it. In some cases, the power of the competitor is so overwhelming that a coalition including one or more additional allies is necessary for successful balancing. Should an essential coalitional ally make its support against the common threat conditional on the strength of its partners, this will serve as a direct impetus for them to work together to improve their capabilities. In this sense, while increasing the threatened states' security, an alliance also makes them dependent on the common ally and serves as a tool which it can use to control or influence their behavior.[13] The extent of control that the ally can exercise will depend on the threatened states' fear of losing its support against the common adversary.[14] Thus, the wish to preserve the commitment of a common ally can create an additional powerful incentive for the former rivals to cooperate.

After former adversaries start cooperation, the common ally can act as a guarantor of their commitment to its maintenance. While few studies in international relations have examined the cooperation between postwar partners, the enforcement and maintenance of cooperative peace settlements have been key issues of civil war research.[15] Like interstate rivals, groups fighting in civil wars

---

13) Paul Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Klaus Knorr (ed.), *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1976).

14) Glenn Snyder, *Alliance Politics*(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 320–325.

15) Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 89, No. 3 (1995); Barbara Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997); Barbara Walter, "Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization,

hesitate to trust each other under anarchy. Therefore, the role of a third-party actor who has self-interest, capability, and resolve to guarantee the peace settlement becomes essential. A third-party guarantor can not only protect the groups, but also intervene in the case of violation of settlement.[16] For interstate cooperation, a great power ally can play the role of third-party guarantor. It can facilitate the process of reconciliation between former enemies by alleviating their mutual insecurity.

Once states agree on the necessity of cooperation, concerns about cheating can be alleviated by building trust. In the anarchic international environment where no higher authority exists to guarantee the implementation of agreements, trust can still be built on a principle of reciprocity where cooperation on one side invites response in kind by the other side.[17] Successful cooperation relies on the ability of the partners to continue building credibility through costly signaling as the stakes gradually increase.[18] In addition to this, a powerful ally can credibly deter or punish defection, thereby relieving concerns about cheating. In the context of post-war peacekeeping, the first step toward building trust is to closely adhere to the rules of the peace agreement signed between the adversaries at the end of the conflict. By doing this the former rivals can demonstrate their commitment to sustain cooperation. States that

---

and Commitments to Peace," *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999); Michaela Mattes and Burcu Savun, "Fostering Peace after Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (September 2009).

16) Walter (1997), pp. 336-343.

17) Charles Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender*(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962); Kenneth Oye, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1985), pp. 14-18.

18) Andrew Kydd, "Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation," *International Organization*, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Spring 2000).

wish to overcome their mutual mistrust therefore are likely to keep the first promises they make to each other in order to show their reliability.

Concerns about relative gains are more challenging, but not impossible to overcome. Former adversaries constantly fear that their enemy-come-partner would profit more from cooperation by turning any surpluses into military advantage. However, if the cost of breaking down cooperation is expected to be higher than the benefit of cheating, states can feel reassured about the intentions of their partner. Thus, as the two rivals recognize the need to cooperate, they can agree upon mutually acceptable rules regulating the distribution of benefits of cooperation among them.[19] For instance, such rules can involve putting restrictions on the size and equipment of their military forces or enlisting the support of third parties in resolving the issue through supplemental agreements and international institutions. Again, a common ally can guarantee the observation of these rules, preventing the cooperation from being exploited by a party who pursues relative gains.

Such trust-building efforts lead to extended scope of cooperation, resulting in mutual interdependence. To begin with, in order to improve policy coordination and avoid conflicts, states establish procedures for joint decision making and policy management.[20] As trust accumulates, efficient division of labor according to the natural endowments and industry specialization of the two partners becomes possible in certain fields.[21] Expansion of ties in one field induces cooperation in other areas.[22] Increased interaction

---

19) Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, "The Rational Design of International Institutions," *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Fall 2001), p. 785.

20) Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*(Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1977), pp. 33-37.

21) Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*(Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

between states leads to the establishment of new institutions or joint participation in existing ones.[23)] Institutions in turn help reduce uncertainty and find collective interests, thereby further facilitating cooperation.[24)] Progressively deepening cooperation creates greater interdependence between the former adversaries.

High levels of interdependence increase the likelihood that states will exclude the use of military force as a policy tool against each other. When two partners grow increasingly dependent on mutual exchange, the costs of conflict between them greatly increase as they come to include the cost of disrupted cooperation.[25)]

Ⅲ. How the United States Induced Franco-German Cooperation

The Unites States promoted peace-building between France and Germany by providing them with strong strategic incentive to cooperate. The desire to keep the powerful ally engaged in the competition against the rising Soviet threat became a crucial factor motivating peace-building efforts between the two former rivals.

The United States was a crucial ally of France and West Germany

---

22) Karl Deutsch, Sidney Burrell, Robert Kann, and Maurice Lee, *Political Community and the North American Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Ernst Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958).

23) Moravcsik (1998).

24) Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 12-13, 259.

25) Ibid.; Keohane and Nye (1977), pp. 24-29; Solomon Polachek, "Conflict and Trade," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (March 1980); Solomon Polachek and Judith McDonald, "Strategic Trade and the Incentive for Cooperation," in Manas Chatterji and Linda Forcey (eds.), *Disarmament, Economic Conversion, and Management of Peace* (Westport: Praeger, 1992).

against the Soviet Union. In 1947, President Harry Truman pledged U.S. support for the continent with the so-called Truman Doctrine, marking a turn away from America's traditional reluctance to getting involved in Europe.[26] Two years later, Washington became the leader of the multilateral alliance system that was NATO, committing its economic and military power to the defense of Europe. This was considered necessary, as from the early days of the alliance, it became clear that none of the western Europeans could balance against the Soviet Union on their own. The two most powerful continental members of NATO, France and West Germany (which officially joined in 1955), were individually no match for the Soviet military. The USSR had overwhelming superiority of conventional forces. In 1950, the Soviet had a 9:1 military advantage over France, while Germany was still not allowed to have an army.[27] Over the next decade, Soviet military forces continued to be "vastly superior" to its western European opponents, none of whom stood a reasonable chance of success in conventional war.[28] The major powers of Europe would have sufficient capabilities to offer a meaningful resistance against the Soviet Union only by forming a balancing coalition. Still, U.S. security guarantees were considered critical for opposing Russian aggression particularly in Paris.[29] As the USSR succeeded in the atomic bomb test in 1949, U.S. commitment became even more essential for the preservation of the security of Europe's major powers.

The United States had no interest in carrying the burden of the

---

26) Derek Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945* (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 15.

27) Rosato (2010), p. 43.

28) Ibid., p. 171.

29) Ibid., p. 144.

defense of Europe on its own. From the outset of the Atlantic alliance system, Washington planned to demand that its continental allies took equal responsibility for their own security. American officials believed that a coalition of European states could potentially become powerful enough to counter the USSR. President Eisenhower argued that Western Europe could become a "solid power mass," or "third great power bloc." He expected this potential to allow the United States "to sit back and relax somewhat."[30] Eisenhower's "New Look" policy envisioned countering the Soviet threat through nuclear, naval, and air power. The United States intended to withdraw its ground forces from the European continent, letting the allies take charge of land defense.[31] The U.S. government even hoped that it would be able to completely withdraw its forces from Europe once its regional allies became capable of balancing the Soviets on their own.[32] For this purpose, "Washington considered it essential that Western Europe build up its conventional forces" as Hanrieder attests.[33]

The Americans also believed that for the effort to be successful it was necessary to make sure that the former rivals committed to cooperation. In their view, "if France and Germany remain apart, so that they would again be potential enemies, then indeed there would be grave doubt whether Continental Europe could be made a place of safety."[34] Importantly, the Americans envisioned an expanded role for Germany in NATO and planned to draw significant

---

30) Ibid., pp. 171-175.

31) Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 147-156.

32) Ibid., pp. 148-149.

33) Wolfram Hanrieder, *Germany, America, and Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 41.

34) Edward Fursdon, *The European Defense Community: A History* (London: Macmillan Press, 1980), p. 231.

military contribution from the Bundeswehr.[35] As the American Secretary of state John Foster Dulles stressed before German politicians, "the United States placed the greatest value on a fusion of the French and German armed forces, as this was the only way of keeping these two peoples from ever fighting each other again, and the only way of preventing a resumption of the old European conflicts."[36] The need to see Germany comfortably accepted by the other Western European powers motivated American policy of support for European integration.[37]

The United States pledged to extend security guarantees while demanding burden-sharing by its European allies in exchange. Washington agreed to maintain troops stationed in Europe and to provide a nuclear umbrella while the allies were asked to deploy more of their ground forces to the frontline and to increase their expenditure for the maintenance of alliance. From the start, the Americans encouraged their European counterparts to work together to develop adequate defensive capabilities so that Washington could worry less about "sacrificing their autonomy" by taking full responsibility for the defense of Europe.[38] Their expectations were clear in 1947, when the United States made sure that France would not limit German steel production (as envisioned by the Monnet Plan) by making provision of aid under the Marshall Plan conditional on compliance.[39]

The U.S. position remained unchanged over the following decades.

---

35) Hanrieder (1989), pp. 41-42.
36) Konrad Adenauer, *Memoirs 1945-53*(Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1965), p. 431.
37) Katzenstein (2005), p. 47.
38) Parent (2011), pp. 136-137.
39) Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Daniel Verdier, "European Integration as a Solution to War," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2005), p. 105; Urwin (1991), p. 18.

In the early 1960s, President John Kennedy's administration introduced the so-called flexible response nuclear strategy calling for increased military burden-sharing on the side of the European allies. Unlike its predecessor – President Dwight Eisenhower's massive retaliation strategy, which relied on responding to any Soviet aggression with nuclear power – flexible response was a plan to match the level of the enemy's aggression and escalate proportionately. For France and Germany this involved further increase of their role in the defense of Europe, since it meant that in case of conflict their territories would become the theater of a conventional war for a considerable period of time. Furthermore, the two states had to contribute more for the maintenance of NATO's non-nuclear forces in Europe under the form of taxes and conscription.[40]

By that time, France and Germany had accepted the reality that they would have to work to improve their own security rather than relying entirely on the overseas ally. In France, Jean Monnet, Commissioner-General of the National Planning Board, was firmly convinced that U.S. assistance would depend on the efforts of European states. In 1948, during a visit to the United States he wrote to Prime Minister Robert Schuman, noting that Europeans "may well be sorely disappointed if [they] think that Marshall aid will continue long into the future if Europe fails to show increased and modernised industrial production in the very near future."[41] The West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer also argued that it was essential not only to rearm Germany, but to incorporate German troops in a European army because "the American taxpayer will not agree to

---

40) Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima*(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 157-159.

41) Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, *Correspondance 1947-1953*(Lausanne: Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Centre de Recherches Européennes, 1986), pp. 36-37.

have part of the United States Army, or at least a unit strong enough to defend Western Germany and Western Europe, permanently stationed in Germany." His concern was that "the United States would not for ever keep troops in Europe and Europe itself must therefore take lasting and effective measures against Soviet expansionism (with such assistance as the United States might offer)."[42]

Adenauer's premonition was soon confirmed. In 1956, the New York Times reported that the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chief of Staff Arthur Radford had proposed a plan to cut 800,000 conventional forces in Europe and replace them with units stationed in the United States.[43] This heightened fears that the Americans might leave the FRG. Adenauer expressed concern that if the Radford Plan were implemented, the United States would be unable to intervene in Europe even if the Soviets initiated a crisis, as this would mean starting a nuclear war.[44] The change in U.S. strategic posture under Kennedy led French and German leaders to further doubt U.S. guarantees and to seek bilateral cooperation between themselves.[45]

Leaders in France and West Germany realized that it was only through close collaboration that they could hope to match the threat from the East.[46] Americans and Europeans agreed that deep cooperation, even integration, was necessary to build sufficient

---

42) Quoted in James McAllister, *No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943–1954* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 175, 215.

43) *New York Times*, "Radford Seeking 800,000-Man Cut," July 13, 1956.

44) Mathieu Segers, "The Relance Européenne and the Nuclear Dimension of Franco-German Rapprochement," in Carine Germond and Henning Türk (eds.), *A History of Franco-German Relations in Europe: from "Hereditary Enemies" to Partners* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 182; Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction*, Vol. 2 (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995), pp. 233-237.

45) Michael Sutton, *France and the Construction of Europe, 1944-2007: The Geopolitical Imperative* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), p. 100.

46) Rosato (2010), p. 2.

capabilities to contain the Soviets, while preserving the balance of power within Western Europe. In the words of Monnet, "the effort of Western European countries to meet existing challenges, the danger threatening [them] and the American effort must become a genuinely European effort which only the existence of a Western Federation will make possible."[47] French and German leadership shared commitment to building a close coalition of European states capable of standing up to the Soviet Union, which would fit with American objectives and guarantee continued U.S. support for Europe.[48]

U.S. pressure for shared responsibility for the defense of Europe gave the first pushes toward overcoming of the long antagonism between the formal rivals on the threatened continent. For example, American insistence to speed up German recovery provoked Schuman to come up with the plan for the European Coal and Steal Community (ECSC). Washington expressed strong support for the reconstruction of Germany as a member of the North Atlantic alliance system. This created the need for the French to seek a preemptive way to secure their interests, while accommodating the U.S. objectives among fears and reservations regarding reinforced Germany and American control on the Continent.[49] Later, signals of diminishing U.S. interest in the defense of Europe served as catalysts for specific cooperative incentives. In one such instance, alarmed by the Radford Plan, the German Foreign Minister Franz-Josef Strauss accepted secret proposals for security policy cooperation extended by the French.[50] Later, in negotiations on the

---

47) Monnet and Schuman (1986), pp. 36-37.

48) Rosato (2010).

49) William I. Hitchcock, "France, the Western Alliance, and the Origins of the Schuman Plan, 1948-1950," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Fall 1997), pp. 603-631; Katzenstein (2005), p. 47.

future of the European Economic Community, Germany supported the French position against Britain mainly to secure good relations with Paris amid "fears of a wavering United States commitment."[51]

Ⅳ. How the United States Helped Sustain Cooperation

Once cooperation took off, the role of the United States transformed from promoter to guarantor of peace. During the process of reconciliation, the United States helped ease France and Germany's fears of the other getting an unfair military advantage. Since they resolved to pursue cooperation in order to share the burden for the defense of Europe, Washington actively supported French and German integration efforts directly and through NATO, allowing the two former enemies to commit to building a stable partnership.

Despite having incentive to cooperate, France and West Germany had to overcome the major obstacle of mutual concerns about cheating. As first effort, the leaderships of the two states began demonstrating their commitment to a common cause through personal communication. A series of high-level meetings took place where both sides emphasized the benefits of cooperation and agreed to policy adjustments to ensure that the process of rapprochement did not stall. In November 1956, Adenauer visited French Prime Minister Guy Mollet in Paris. The two leaders discussed their concerns about U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe, agreeing to strengthen security cooperation between their two countries.[52]

---

50) Segers (2008), p. 182.
51) Urwin (1991), p. 96.
52) Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 546–547; Rosato

In 1958, Adenauer and French President Charles de Gaulle reiterated the agreement on the necessity of cooperation. De Gaulle emphasized the "importance of the union of Europe, a union which above all demanded the co-operation of Paris and Bonn" and "reconciling two peoples and uniting their efforts and abilities."[53] In September 1958, the German Chancellor visited the French President in his house in Colombey-les-deux-Églises. De Gaulle told Adenauer that France could "certainly help to rehabilitate [France's] erstwhile aggressor⋯ in the name of the entente to be established between the two peoples, and of the balance of power, the unity and the peace of Europe."[54] He also assured that France would implement the European treaties it had signed. Adenauer demonstrated his own commitment to cooperation by promising three concessions bringing German policy in line with the preferences of the French: "no development of German nuclear weapons, no German pressure for border changes, and an indefinite postponement of reunification."[55] The two leaders continued to exchange state visits in the following years working on rapprochement between their countries. During these meetings they collaborated to improve public perceptions of each state and to showcase the importance of continued cooperation.

The former adversaries supplemented their peaceful rhetoric with actions intended to demonstrate their commitment to peace. The postwar efforts to build mutual trust led to strict observance of the

---

(2010), pp. 199-201; Segers (2008), p.184.

53) Charles De Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), pp. 174-177.

54) Ibid.

55) Jeffrey Glen Giauque, *Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the Reorganization of Western Europe, 1955-1963* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), pp. 85-86.

peace agreements signed after the end of World War II. Before the scope of cooperation began to expand, the Paris Accords were the only written promises regulating relations between France and West Germany. Observing them to the letter was necessary to sustain the process of reconciliation. None of the partners attempted to revise or neglect the implementation of their side of the negotiated deals. Crucially, both sides made concessions on issues related to the Saar question, the Common Market, and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) in order to pave the way for a Franco-German entente aimed at safeguarding Europe in case of U.S. retrenchment.[56] Germany accepted significant constraints on its rearmament aimed at easing French fears.[57] In addition to these mutual efforts, the FRG worked to show its commitment not to repeat past wrongdoings by making the necessary amends. For example, Bonn agreed to provide apt compensation for the crimes committed by the Nazi regime. In a bilateral agreement signed with Paris in July 1960, Bonn pledged to offer material indemnity to the victims.[58] On its side, as early as 1955, France demonstrated its enthusiasm for cooperation by agreeing to return the Saar to German control after a referendum showed that the local population favored remaining a part of the FRG.[59] This became a significant step towards the stabilization of Franco-German rapprochement, because, in the words of one diplomat, it was "very, very important… in creating trust."[60]

As a result of years of efforts on both sides to build the trust

---

56) Ibid.

57) Lind (2008), p. 125; Segers (2008), p. 184.

58) Lily Gardner Feldman, *Germany's Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: From Enmity to Amity*(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), pp. 83-84.

59) Julius Friend, *The Linchpin: French-German Relations, 1950-1990*(New York: Praeger, 1991), pp. 24-25.

60) Quoted in Kupchan (2010), p. 207.

necessary for sustained cooperation, concerns about cheating visibly waned. An opinion poll taken in 1961 showed a significant change from a few years prior with 57 percent of the French now answering that they trust Germany, while 76 percent of the West Germans declared trusting France.[61] Perceptions continued to improve with the French public soon, declaring Germany to be "the best friend of France."[62] The process of reconciliation officially came to fruition with the signing of the Élysée Treaty in 1963, which became the cornerstone of Franco-German friendship. The agreement formalized cooperation and became a symbol of "the degree to which France and Germany had come to attribute to one another benign character, making war between them unthinkable and giving stable peace a taken-for-granted quality."[63]

France and the FRG worked equally hard to solve their concerns about the fair distribution of the gains of cooperation. The challenges presented before the former adversaries were most evident in negotiations related to the EDC where Germany demanded to be treated as equal, while France insisted on strict controls of German rearmament.[64] The Germans welcomed military integration that would allow the revival of their military, but considered the EDC plan to be "discriminatory" and "just a dodge to make sure that any German troops which may be raised are placed under French command." Their main objection was that the plan was "based on the principle of German inequality."[65] As France and West Germany clearly recognized the need to cooperate, they

---

61) Puchala (1970), pp. 188-191.
62) Lind (2008), p. 124.
63) Kupchan (2010), p. 207.
64) Hanrieder (1989), p. 40.
65) Rosato (2010), p. 123.

attempted to draft mutually acceptable rules regulating the distribution of benefits among them. Paris, for example, reassured Bonn that its military would be treated as equal to that of France causing the FRG to warm up toward the idea of an integrated European army. The first step to success was the signing of the Paris Treaty establishing the EDC by France, the FRG, Italy, and the Benelux countries in 1952 following a French initiative. It was again the French, however, who sealed the premature end of the community when the National Assembly failed to ratify the Treaty in 1954. Herriot criticized the agreement on grounds that "it contravenes the French constitution since it entails an abandonment of national sovereignty without reciprocity." The President of the National Assembly was concerned specifically that "certain advantages accrue to Germany but none to France."[66] When bilateral efforts proved to be insufficient to alleviate mutual concerns about the possible consequences of one or the other side gaining a military advantage, Paris and Bonn looked for guarantees from Washington.

When the EDC failed, the United States provided the alternative – a promise to control German rearmament within the NATO alliance, assuming the role of guarantor of European security. As Rosato notes, this served to "reduce French fears of being overwhelmed by Germany and persuade them to proceed with German rearmament."[67] The presence of the United States in Europe in the 1950s reassured the former enemies that none of them could use military force to improve its position against the other. Experts attest that "the principal reason that American troops did not come home is because U.S. and European leaders believed that their presence helps keep the European states from engaging in security competition with each

---

66) Fursdon (1980), p. 201.
67) Rosato (2010), p. 144.

other" and that the political reconciliation between France and Germany would not have happened without NATO.[68] The continued reliance of European major powers on U.S. military assistance had given Washington significant leverage to influence their foreign policies, which served as an instrument to help alleviate fears of one or the other gaining an unequal military advantage. U.S.-led institutions, most notably NATO, were also instrumental in increasing transparency by allowing access to the military facilities and organizations in European states and helped maintain channels of communication.[69] The United States also spent a total of 3 to 4 million dollars to encourage "federalist activities" in Europe from 1949 to 1960.[70] Having received U.S. guarantees, European countries could afford to become "remarkably insensitive to relative gains" despite their long history of competition.[71] As Urwin concludes, they were able to explore integration "due in no small measure to the healthier political, economic, and military situation which the United States had helped to provide."[72]

With the United States accepting the role of a guarantor in Europe, France and the FRG began building a system for joint decision making and deliberation. The Élysée Treaty signed in 1963, established principles for cooperation and marked the beginning of close policy alignment between the two nations. The Treaty stipulated for regular meetings and close coordination of foreign and defense policy. As Kissinger described it, with this pivotal treaty the former adversaries

---

68) Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Agenda for NATO – Toward a Global Security Web," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 5 (September/October 2009), p. 5; Hanrieder (1989), p. 37.

69) Kupchan (2010), p. 215.

70) Lundestad (1998), pp. 42-43.

71) Simon Collard-Wexler, "Integration under Anarchy: Neorealism and the European Union," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2006), p. 403.

72) Urwin (1991), p. 43.

agreed to "consult each other, prior to any decision, on all important questions of foreign policy, and in the first place on questions of common interests."[73] The text stipulated a "rapprochement of military doctrines" and "common conceptions" about European defense, and established regular meetings between the high-level officials of each country, which would soon become common practice.[74] Rather than setting certain goals or policies, it focused on the formulation of processes of interaction between the two governments.[75] This consultation mechanism has been used to resolve a range of issues in the following decades from the unification of Germany to confrontations on the euro zone debt crisis.

As trust started to accumulate, efficient division of labor became possible in certain vital fields. Economic cooperation intensified progressively. By 1955, when both France and West Germany became fellow members of NATO, economic cooperation was already being actively promoted at the governmental level. In 1955, a Special Committee for Agriculture was established to coordinate agricultural policy. The two states agreed that France would import industrial products from Germany, while Germany would import agricultural products from France.[76] This resulted in a clear split of responsibilities between the two countries: as France had advantage in agriculture and Germany in heavy industry and manufactured goods, their roles came to be accepted as being complementary.[77]

---

73) Kissinger (1994), p. 615.

74) Philip Gordon, *France, Germany, and the Western Alliance*(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 13-14.

75) Ulrich Krotz, "Regularized Intergovernmentalism: France–Germany and Beyond (1963–2009)," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2010), p. 155-157.

76) Willis (1968), pp. 235–236.

77) Ripsman (2016), p. 58.

Increased interaction also led to the establishment of new institutions by France and Germany and an expansion of participation in existing ones. The two former rivals were key members of every Western European regional organization starting from the ECSC, the EEC, and EURATOM, which formed the basis of the European Union (EU). The consultative system for government officials of the Élysée Treaty was firmly institutionalized in the economic sector. For instance, by the late 1980s, the regular high-level meetings between officials in charge of economic affairs of the two states initiated with the Treaty developed into an official "coordination organ for economic and monetary policies" – the Franco-German Council for Economics and Finance.[78]

Expansion of ties in the economic field gradually led to institutionalization of relations in other areas including security. Despite the rocky start with the failing of the EDC, military cooperation between European states began within the framework of NATO and eventually extended to unprecedented integration of military power as envisioned in proposals from the early post-war years. Paris and Bonn began to expand bilateral defense and security cooperation in the early 1980s. Regular meetings at the ministerial level and discussions aimed to promote policy coordination while the French floated the idea of extending a nuclear umbrella over Europe. In 1982, a Commission on Security and Defense was established with working groups on "arms collaboration, military cooperation, and politico-strategic issues."[79] Building on the success on the Commission, in 1988, a new protocol was added to the Élysée Treaty establishing a Franco-German Defense and

---

78) Krotz (2010), p. 165.
79) Robert Grant, "French Defense Policy and European Security," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 100, No. 3 (1985), p. 425.

Security Council, where leaders of both states together with the foreign and defense ministers and top military figures would meet twice per year to discuss and coordinate policy.[80] In 1989, a French German Brigade was created under the Council with approximately 4,200 soldiers from the two states, which served as a "powerful symbol of cooperation and reconciliation between the two former enemy armies as well as a testing ground for future forms of bilateral military integration."[81] In 1992, the Brigade expanded into the Eurocorps—a highly autonomous military organization with shared Franco-German command and French and German troops stationed in each other's territories.[82] French and German defense and security initiatives served as basis for remarkable achievements in the broader process of European integration with the two states playing a key role in the development of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy.[83]

As the number of organizations established or joined by France and Germany grew, the potential for conflict between the two states decreased accordingly. The overlapping memberships in multiple institutions contributed to further expansion of mutual commitments, increased realization of collective interest, and reduced uncertainty.[84] The limits set by the WEU and NATO on German power and the security guarantees provided by the United States mitigated discord over German rearmament. EURATOM took control over the management of fissile materials making it easier for France to accept

---

80) Amaya Bloch-Lainé, "Franco-German Co-operation in Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence: A Case Study," in Douglas Webber (ed.), *The Franco-German Relationship in the European Union*(London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 156-157; Gordon (1995), p. 23.

81) Ibid., pp. 23-24.

82) Ibid., pp. 41-46.

83) Bloch-Lainé (1999), p. 157.

84) Kupchan (2010), pp. 214-215.

German development of nuclear power. Potential economic disagreements were resolved within the framework of the EEC.[85] Other EU institutions evolved and gradually started taking over authority from the member states in a number of areas, including monetary policy, criminal matters, and foreign policy. Thus empowered, European organizations continue to provide multiple venues for resolution of conflicts between the former adversaries. The Economic and Financial Council, for example, has authority to perform investigations and issue recommendations for policy to the government on persistent problems such as trade imbalances and environmental regulations.[86] Any other newly arising issues between the two governments can be peacefully handled through the institutions of the EU.

Even if a crisis threatened to escalate beyond what could be resolved through institutions, the increasing costs of using force between France and Germany would have served as an additional restraining mechanism. With the establishment of the EEC, trade and foreign investment between France and Germany began expanding at a rapid rate. More important, however, was the fact that increased interdependence fostered strong domestic interests in sustained cooperation such as farmers who benefitted from compensatory payments provided by the EEC. Leaders choosing to end cooperation would face a penalty having to find an alternative way to repay these groups. The common currency adopted in 2002 also inhibits conflict by creating substantial costs for the side that defects from cooperation.[87] In addition, increased interaction between non-state actors resulting from state policies over time limited the capacity

---

85) Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Verdier (2005), pp. 108-109.
86) Krotz (2010), p. 165.
87) Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Verdier (2005), pp. 121-122.

of European governments to restrain the process of further integration, including that of their defense industries.[88] As a result, defense industry consolidation has advanced in Europe making it more difficult to consider the interests of states in the region separately from one another.

Even the waning of the Soviet threat has not resulted in weakening of ties between France and Germany. Supporting this conclusion is the fact that NATO members have chosen to increase their reliance on each other for weapons procurement after the end of the Cold War rather than focus on internal arming.[89] If the two former enemies anticipated conflict between themselves, they would have been more likely to engage in arms buildup or cooperation with outside partners. A case in point is the low level of arms industry cooperation between Western European states and Russia where the prospects for future conflict has not been eliminated.[90] France and Germany went in the opposite direction by deepening integration of their arms industries. For example, in 1996, joined by Italy and the United Kingdom, they founded the Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) — an institution managing cooperative armament programs.[91] With a letter of intent, the defense ministers of member states pledged to work to promote the constitution and operation of transnational defense companies in

---

88) Rachel Epstein, "Divided Continent: Globalization and Europe's Fragmented Security Response," in Jonathan Kirshner (ed.), *Globalization and National Security* (New York: Routledge, 2006); Elisabeth Sköns and Herbert Wulf, "The Internationalization of the Arms Industry," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 535 (1994).

89) Ethan Kapstein, "Allies and Armaments," *Survival,* Vol. 44, No. 2 (2002).

90) Ian Anthony (ed.), *Russia and Arms Trade* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Sköns and Wulf (1994), p. 50.

91) Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation, "Letter of Intent on Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring of the European Defense Industry," London (July 6, 1998).

Europe by guaranteeing stable supply for production in times of conflict and war, easing rules for exchange of confidential information and technology, and harmonizing military requirements. Such developments are a clear indication that France and Germany have seized to see each other as likely aggressors.

Ultimately, benefitting from the guarantees provided by the United States, France and Germany sustained cooperative efforts and excluded the option of using military force against each other. After the peace agreement of 1954, they have shown no sign of attempting or even considering aggression as a means to resolve standing disagreements. The two former enemies have not engaged in military confrontation for 75 years – the longest peace in the history of their relations, nor have they designated each other as potential enemies. Clashes between French presidents and German chancellors over issues such as the common currency in 1996 and labor market regulations in 2019 have been consistently handled through dialogue and negotiation in the absence of violence.

V. Conclusion

This analysis found that the United States helped France and Germany achieve stable peace by providing strategic incentives for sustained cooperation. We have argued that the great power ally provided impetus for reconciliation between the former adversaries by demanding that each of them shared the burden of the defense of Western Europe against the threat from the Soviet Union. European leaders realized that to keep the United States involved on the continent they would have to build sufficient self-defense capabilities to alleviate U.S. fears of having to carry the full weight

of stopping Soviet aggression. Since it was only possible to build sufficient capabilities to balance through close cooperation, the two states worked to overcome their mutual distrust in order to allow the effort to succeed. Once cooperation was under way, Washington continued to provide assistance in alleviating mutual distrust and concerns over the relative gains of cooperation by committing to restrain aggression among its allies. Sustained cooperation gradually led to increased interdependence between France and Germany, which in turn raised the costs of the use of military force making war a prohibitively expensive endeavor. By eliminating the use of military force as a tool for resolving conflicts among them, the two former adversaries fulfilled the conditions for stable peace.

These findings challenge several prominent theoretical accounts related to the unprecedented level of cooperation achieved in the aftermath of World War II in Western Europe. First, they demonstrate that the processes of peace making and peace keeping greatly benefit from the involvement of interested great powers in the role of pacifiers. This suggests that the question addressed by peace socialization theory regarding the importance of top-down or bottom-up pressure for reconciliation should be expanded to include incentives from third parties to provide a more complete explanation for stable peace.[92] The discussion also helps clarify disagreements regarding the order of events leading to stable peace in Europe. U.S. incentives came first leading to conscious efforts on the side of France and Germany to sustain cooperation. This is turn led to the building of the European institutions, which, once in place, served as a driver of further cooperation, thus creating a cycle of peace maintained to this day.

---

92) Ikenberry (2000); Kupchan (2010); Ripsman (2016).

This article suggests some implications for the policy of the United States towards its allies in strategically important regions. Specifically, it underscores the unintended consequences of Washington's potential turn toward an isolationist foreign policy, expressed in withdrawal from international multilateral cooperation and reduced alliance commitments around the globe.[93] As seen in the Franco-German case, a great power ally has significant leverage over its regional partners, which can be used with great success to promote cooperation creating conditions conductive to stable peace between strategic adversaries. A peace regime on the Korean Peninsula could potentially be stabilized with either U.S. or possibly U.S.-China joint security guarantees to both Koreas. At present, this may seem as a remote scenario considering the antagonism between Pyongyang and Washington, but in the long run it might become a viable solution to the Korean problem.

---

93) Robert Jervis, Francis J. Gavin, Joshua Rovner, and Diane Labrosse (eds.), *Chaos in the Liberal Order: The Trump Presidency and International Politics in the Twenty-First Century*(New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).

[References]

Adenauer, Konrad. *Memoirs 1945-53*(Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1965).

Anthony, Ian (ed.). *Russia and Arms Trade*(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

Art, Robert. "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy after the Cold War." *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Spring 1991).

Binnendjik, Hans, and Richard Kugler. "Transform NATO: Don't End It." *The National Interest*, Vol. 75 (2004).

Bloch-Lainé, Amaya. "Franco-German Co-operation in Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence: A Case Study." In Douglas Webber (ed.). *The Franco-German Relationship in the European Union*(London: Routledge, 1999).

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "A Agenda for NATO – Toward a Global Security Web." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 5 (September/October 2009).

De Gaulle, Charles. *Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor*(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971).

Collard-Wexler, Simon. "Integration under Anarchy: Neorealism and the European Union." *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2006).

Deutsch, Karl, Sidney Burrell, Robert Kann, and Maurice Lee. *Political Community and the North American Area*(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette, and Daniel Verdier. "European Integration as a Solution to War." *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2005).

Epstein, Rachel. "Divided Continent: Globalization and Europe's Fragmented Security Response." In Jonathan Kirshner (ed.). *Globalization and National Security*(New York: Routledge, 2006).

Feldman, Lily Gardner. *Germany's Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: From Enmity to Amity*(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012).

Friend, Julius. *The Linchpin: French-German Relations, 1950-1990*(New York: Praeger, 1991).

Fursdon, Edward. *The European Defense Community: A History*(London: Macmillan Press, 1980).

George, Alexander. *On Foreign Policy: Unfinished Business* (London: Routledge, 2006).

Giauque, Jeffrey Glen. *Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the Reorganization of Western Europe, 1955-1963* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

Gordon, Philip. *France, Germany, and the Western Alliance* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995).

Grant, Robert. "French Defense Policy and European Security." *Political Science Quarterly,* Vol. 100, No. 3 (1985).

Grieco, Joseph. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism." *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988).

Haas, Ernst. *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958).

Hanrieder, Wolfram. *Germany, America, and Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

Hitchcock, William I. "France, the Western Alliance, and the Origins of the Schuman Plan, 1948-1950." *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Fall 1997).

Ikenberry, John. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

Jervis, Robert, Francis J. Gavin, Joshua Rovner, and Diane N. Labrosse (eds.). *Chaos in the Liberal Order: The Trump Presidency and International Politics in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).

Joffe, Josef. "Europe's American Pacifier." *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 54 (1984).

Kapstein, Ethan. "Allies and Armaments." *Survival*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (2002).

Katzenstein, Peter. *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

Keohane, Robert. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

Keohane, Robert, and Joseph Nye. *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1977).

Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).

Krotz, Ulrich. "Regularized Intergovernmentalism: France–Germany and

Beyond (1963–2009)." *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2010).

Kupchan, Charles. *How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. "The Rational Design of International Institutions." *International Organization,* Vol. 55, No. 4 (Fall 2001).

Kydd, Andrew. "Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation." *International Organization*, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Spring 2000).

Leviero, Anthony. "Radford Seeking 800,000-Man Cut." *New York Times*, July 13, 1956.

Licklider, Roy. "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 89, No. 3 (1995).

Lind, Jennifer. *Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics*(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).

Lovett, A. W. "The United States and the Schuman Plan. A Study in French Diplomacy 1950-1952." *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (June 1996).

Lundestad, Geir. *"Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997*(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

Mandelbaum, Michael. *The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima*(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

Mattes, Michaella, and Burcu Savun. "Fostering Peace after Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design." *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (September 2009).

McAllister, James. *No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943–1954* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).

McGeehan, Robert. *The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense after World War II*(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971).

Mearsheimer, John. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001).

Monnet, Jean, and Robert Schuman. *Correspondance 1947-1953*(Lausanne: Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Centre de Recherches Européennes, 1986). Translation by http://www.cvce.eu (Accessed October 18, 2020).

Moravcsik, Andrew. *The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).

Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation. "Letter of Intent on Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring of the European Defense Industry." London (July 6, 1998).

Osgood, Charles. *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962).

Oye, Kenneth. "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies." *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1985).

Parent, Joseph. *Uniting States: Voluntary Union in World Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Parsons, Craig. *A Certain Idea of Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

Polachek, Solomon. "Conflict and Trade." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (March 1980).

Polachek, Solomon, and Judith McDonald. "Strategic Trade and the Incentive for Cooperation." In Manas Chatterji and Linda Forcey (eds.). *Disarmament, Economic Conversion, and Management of Peace* (Westport: Praeger, 1992).

Puchala, Donald. "Integration and Disintegration in Franco-German Relations, 1954-1965." *International Organization*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Spring 1970).

Ripsman, Norrin. *Peacemaking from Above, Peace from Below: Ending Conflict between Regional Rivals* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016).

Rosato, Sebastian. *Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010).

Schroeder, Paul. "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management." In Klaus Knorr (ed.). *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1976).

Schwarz, Hans-Peter. *Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction*, Vol. 2 (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995).

Segers, Mathieu. "The Relance Européenne and the Nuclear Dimension of Franco-German Rapprochement." In Carine Germond and Henning Türk (eds.). *A History of Franco-German Relations in Europe: from "Hereditary Enemies" to Partners* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

Sköns, Elisabeth, and Herbert Wulf. "The Internationalization of the Arms Industry." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 535 (1994).

Snyder, Glenn. *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

Sutton, Michael. *France and the Construction of Europe, 1944-2007: The Geopolitical Imperative*(New York: Berghahn Books, 2007).

Trachtenberg, Marc. *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963*(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999).

Urwin, Derek. *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945*(London: Routledge, 1991).

Van Evera, Stephen. "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War." *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91).

Walter, Barbara. "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement." *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997).

_____. "Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and Commitments to Peace." *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999).

Willis, Roy. *France, Germany, and the New Europe: 1945-1967*(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968).

Waltz, Kenneth. *Theory of International Politics*(Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

[국문초록]

프랑스와 독일의 안정적 평화:
미국의 역할을 중심으로

최성은 | 럿거스 대학교
요르단카 알렉산드로바 | 고려대학교

　이 논문은 제2차 세계대전 이후 프랑스와 독일 간 안정적 평화의 달성에 있어서 미국의 역할을 규명한다. 미국은 두 과거의 적대국들 사이에 협력이 지속될 수 있도록 전략적 유인을 제공하였다. 첫째, 미국은 소련의 잠재적 위협에 대항하여 유럽에 방위공약을 제공하는 한편, 그 조건으로 프랑스와 독일에게 각자의 방위 책임을 분담시켰다. 양국은 소련에 효과적으로 대응하기 위해 강력한 역외 동맹국으로부터 지원과 더불어 그들 상호 간의 협력이 필요함을 인식하였다. 둘째, 협력이 진행됨에 따라, 미국은 프랑스와 독일 간의 화해 과정에서 보증인의 역할을 수행하였다. 유럽에 지속적으로 안전보장을 제공함으로써, 미국은 두 국가가 신뢰를 구축하고 상대적 이득에 대한 서로의 우려를 극복하도록 도왔다. 그 결과, 과거의 두 적대국은 서로에 대한 군사력 사용을 배제하는 안정적 평화의 상태를 달성하였다.