[칼럼] No timeline for denuclearization
김동현 (일민국제관계연구원 방문학자)

Another U.S.-North Korea summit will come and go, but the challenge of denuclearizing North Korea won't go away for a long time.

Even if a timeline for denuclearization is set in Hanoi this week, which is unlikely, there is no guarantee that it will be enforced on schedule.

The second summit will not be the last, regardless of its success or failure. Even critics of U.S. President Donald Trump's handling of North Korea approve the utility of talks for enhancing mutual understanding and avoiding catastrophic conflict. Talk of peace is better than that of war.

Trump claims that he has a good relationship with the North. That's not a bad thing. The current situation, even with no actual reduction of security threats, is preferred over the dangerous exchange of belligerent rhetoric during 2017. Trump keeps saying he is in "no rush." He is not giving up the ultimate goal of final verified denuclearization.

At times, Trump sounds as if he would be content with a continuing moratorium on nuclear and missile tests by the North, as long as there would not be a major war with the North, which he falsely believes would have occurred under the Obama administration.

Any plausible path to denuclearization of the North ― eliminating all of its nuclear weapons and delivery systems as well as production facilities ― may take as long as 10 years in the view of some experts, even if negotiations succeed in reaching actionable agreements.

Maybe Trump is lowering expectations of his second summit, knowing that the North Korean leader is unlikely to make a dramatic offer of positive steps forward beyond what has been reported he is willing to do. That includes inspections of the demolished nuclear and missile testing sites, and dismantlement of the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon.

Maybe Trump is pressuring Kim at the last minute to make progress, by repeating his firm position on sanctions, until Kim does "something meaningful." Trump knows that negotiation is a process of give and take. If a phased roadmap is worked out, he knows he will have to match progress in each phase with some kind of concessions.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has mentioned a timeline that will complete denuclearization by the end of Trump's first term. However, given the widely accepted assessment that the North won't get rid of all its nuclear weapons any time soon, a final resolution appears impossible to achieve in that timeline. Yet it may be possible to limit the North's nuclear capability for a better security environment.

A phased approach should seek the following steps: (1) stop all activities of producing and advancing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles; (2) dismantle all nuclear and missile production facilities; (3) secure the North's commitment against first use of nuclear weapons; (4) limit, contain and reduce the nuclear arsenal; (5) secure a nonproliferation measure to prohibit transfer of any weapons of mass destruction and related technology; and (6) finally, dismantle and remove all nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

Each of these phases requires verified implementation by the North and reciprocal rewards from Washington. In return for progress that the North will commit to make, Washington may consider, or may be already considering, a wide range of political, economic and security incentives, including:(1) work toward improved relations and a peace regime as agreed in Singapore; (2) declare a non-aggression accord, with an assurance against any preventive nuclear strike; (3) set up liaison offices in exchange; (4) relax the relevant sanctions to allow the reopening of a joint industrial complex at Gaeseong, as well as Mount Geumgang tourism; (5) endorse Seoul's other inter-Korean economic projects; (6) amend U.N. resolutions and U.S. sanctions to increase humanitarian assistance; (7) lift the travel ban for Americans to visit North Korea; (8) remove the DPRK again from the list of countries sponsoring terrorism, and (9) maintain only a moderate level of military drills with South Korea and support Seoul's efforts to reduce tensions in the DMZ.

At some point, the U.S. may consider rewriting the U.N. sanctions in such a way as to increase the limits of Pyongyang's imports and exports ― especially for oil, coal and textiles ― and to permit North Korean workers to earn foreign exchange from abroad.

North Korea also has a lot more to offer to maintain a constrictive atmosphere and build trust. For example, it should consider returning the captured Pueblo ship that it exploits for anti-American propaganda. It also can increase its cooperation to recover and repatriate the remains of American soldiers killed during the Korean War.

In summary, don't hold your breath over the Hanoi summit. The show will go on for a long time.

[The Korea Times, 2019-02-25]
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2019/02/137_264245.html