[칼럼] Likely outcome of a second summit
김동현 (일민국제관계연구원 방문학자)
U.S. President Donald Trump announced during his State of the Union address last Tuesday that he will meet Kim Jong-un on Feb. 27-28 in Vietnam, without specifying which city will be the venue for his second meeting with the North Korean leader.
Some recent reports help understanding of where denuclearization talks stand today. The U.S. intelligence community told a Senate hearing that "North Korea is unlikely to give up all of its nuclear weapons and production capabilities because its leaders ultimately view nuclear weapons as critical to regime survival."
Stephen Biegun, U.S. special representative for North Korea, did not dispute the accuracy of the intelligence assessment but said he was frustrated with "how it was presented and interpreted" in terms of the policy that has to address threats from such information. Biegun made this comment during a speech at Stanford University, before he went to Seoul and Pyongyang to prepare for the summit.
His Stanford speech revealed several important indications:
(1) The Trump administration is accepting the North's negotiation formula of moving step-by-step toward denuclearization "simultaneously and in parallel" with progress toward peace in Korea;
(2) The administration is changing the trajectory of its policy to change Pyongyang's policy;
(3) Trump is ready to end the Korean War by a declaration;
(4) The administration is seeking "the right balance" between a pressure campaign and negotiations with the North;
(5) The North is ready to get rid of nuclear production facilities, including uranium enrichment plants at Yongbyon and elsewhere, and they will do "more" in return for "corresponding measures;"
(6) There is no common definition of "complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" as it is understood by both sides, and
(7) Washington seems to be backing down on its demand for a declaration of the North's nuclear arsenal, although it will require a full inventory of the North's nuclear arsenal at some point along the path to denuclearization.
Whatever results Biegun may have been able to produce in his talks with his counterpart, Kim Hyok-chol, an ambassador-level diplomat assigned to Kim's council of state affairs, even if there had been a big breakthrough, other than a normal arrangement for a summit, it is unlikely that they will be made public. They will be reserved for their leaders' final decision and for a special limelight of credits to them.
Public attention is focused on what concessions Trump will make as "corresponding measures" for appropriate actions the North may agree to take, in addition to reconfirmation of its commitment to "complete denuclearization." Discussions of normalization and a peace regime can proceed in parallel with denuclearization talks as an incentive to the North.
A partial lifting of sanctions, if not a phase-out scheme may be necessary to move forward. At the same time, a backup plan can be considered to snap-back the sanctions if the North fails in its commitment at a given phase.
The idea of an exchange of liaison offices or setting up an escrow account or access to international financial institutions to assist the North's economic development is not very attractive to Pyongyang. The North Koreans are pragmatic enough to settle for immediate benefits from relaxed sanctions than waiting for a rosy bright future that the Trump administration allures them with upon their complete denuclearization. To them, it is "a pie in the sky."
Any offer of ending the war should not affect the enforcement of the armistice agreement until it is replaced by a peace regime, nor should it be linked to any discussion of troop reduction or withdrawal. South Korea has just agreed to raise its share of the expenses associated with the presence of U.S. forces in Korea, kicking the can for another year.
Maybe someday there will be no need for a military alliance against North Korea, only if the North transforms into a normal state that can live in peace with its neighbors, without threatening them. Denuclearization is the first step to this possibility.
From all indications available ― including Trump's penchant for taking credit for himself and Kim 's needs for domestic consumption ― the next summit in Vietnam will likely produce a positive step forward for the good of all parties concerned. The outcome from the next meeting will not be a final resolution but it will be more concrete in the direction of denuclearization than that of the first one that was held eight months ago in Singapore.
[The Korea Times, 2019-02-08]
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2019/02/137_263318.html