김동현 (일민국제관계연구원 방문학자)
The U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi ended without any agreement, a setback for both parties. This summit was not expected to produce a major breakthrough like a comprehensive package deal toward the complete denuclearization of North Korea. Yet, the setback came as somewhat of a surprise to most people.
The essence of the summit failure lay in the fundamental disparity in their approach to negotiations and the mismatch of offers from both sides.
From the beginning, the North insisted on a phased, synchronized denuclearization process. The U.S. side recently seemed willing to accept that approach; however, in Hanoi, President Donald Trump apparently sought a "big deal" that would provide an agreed scope and a general roadmap to denuclearization.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un was simply not ready for this kind of deal. He offered verified dismantlement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, consisting of more than 300 buildings, in trade for a major lifting of sanctions.
Kim's foreign minister Ri Young-ho said the North demanded only a partial lifting, refuting Trump's characterization of lifting "sanctions in their entirety." In fact both were right. Ri was technically right because they sought the lifting of five out of 11 U.N. sanction packages. Trump was right in terms of the impact of lifting the sanctions that the North wanted.
If Kim had thought he could get what he wanted based on the supposed good relationship between Trump and him built through mutual flattery and "love letters" or based on an assessment of Trump's domestic political needs, he was wrong.
Trump was equally wrong if he had thought he could secure the kind of deal he wanted, simply by painting the concept of a bright future for North Korea as an "economic powerhouse," while keeping all the sanctions in place until after complete denuclearization. From the North's perspective, Trump's offer was a mismatch of words and actions.
The U.S. offers of incentives such as ending the Korean War or setting up liaison offices or a bright economic future for the North were not enough for the North to give up the Yongbyon facilities, which constitute a major portion of the North's nuclear program.
Beyond Yongbyon, the North is believed to be operating more nuclear production sites, producing enriched uranium to make more nuclear bombs. Kim's proposal did not mention what he would do with his nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles or chemical and biological weapons.
The North would prefer that any disposition of such weapons of mass destruction will only come in the last phase of denuclearization. If the North will really give up its nuclear weapons, it would happen only when the North is convinced that it can survive without them.
Some argue Trump's "friendly walkaway" was not a summit failure because he chose no deal over a bad deal in the security interests of the United States. Although there was no agreement for when to meet again or how to pick up the talks from where they left off, there are clear indications from Washington and Pyongyang that both sides want to continue their negotiation.
Perhaps, when the dust settles, a working level dialogue will start again. The "top-down" diplomacy has been tried, but unlike for the first summit in Singapore, President Trump appeared to have listened to his advisers in Hanoi to reject the unbalanced small deal.
The Hanoi outcome also shows working level discussions, including those at a cabinet level, did not produce a substantive agreement that their leaders could accept in formality. Trump could go back to the traditional format of summit diplomacy by delegating more authority to lower level negotiators.
One problem with a working level negotiation is that it tends to be time consuming. It will not succeed if the negotiators repeat the same demands that led to a setback in Hanoi. For Kim, this issue has a top priority ― as he should know there is no "third path" which he mentioned in his New Year address. The third way ― perhaps meaning a return to economic and nuclear development in parallel ― will not guarantee his survival.
Both parties should study the lessons learned from Hanoi by reviewing what went wrong and designing a new strategy from scratch in order to find the best possible, pragmatic path toward denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
The government is in a delicate situation to mediate between Pyongyang and Washington to keep them on track for talks, and preventing them from falling back to the threats of war in 2017, without undermining its traditional alliance with Washington.
[The Korea Times, 2019-03-10]
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2019/03/137_265036.html