김동현 일민국제관계연구원 방문학자
Following an uneasy period of uncertainty, the United States and North Korea are ready to start their working-level talks at the end of this month, or shortly thereafter, at a place yet to be determined.
The next round of negotiations will be a re-starting point to discuss and explore new ways to implement the 2018 Singapore summit agreement ― to improve relations, to build a peace regime, and "to work for complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."
The impending resumption of talks is attributed to President Donald Trump's sustaining political interest in making a nuclear deal with Kim Jong-un and the firing of his national security adviser John Bolton, as well as to North Korea's interest in survival through a renewed diplomatic attempt.
On Sept. 20, Pyongyang announced its roving ambassador Kim Myong-gil will lead a DPRK negotiating team when it meets with a U.S. team for which Stephen Biegun is likely to serve as senior delegate.
In a statement published by the KCNA, the newly appointed North Korean chief negotiator praised President Trump for making a "wise political decision to approach the DPRK-U.S. relations from a more practical point of view." He welcomed the departure of former national security adviser Bolton from the White House, who was referred to as "a nasty trouble-maker" in the statement.
Kim's statement sheds light on what Pyongyang wants: Washington coming to the table with "a new method of calculation" to accept their offer of "a step-by-step solution starting with feasible things first, while building trust in each other." The North seeks U.S. assurances of regime security and sanctions lifting.
Unlike the North's two earlier statements directed at Washington ― the first one by first vice foreign minister Choe Sun-hui on Sep 9 and the second one by the foreign ministry's director-general for U.S. affairs on Sept. 16, Kim's statement did not mention a possible downside to the upcoming talks in case of their failure.
North Korea typically issues double-edge statements of hope and warning. Choe expressed "a willingness to sit down with the U.S. side for comprehensive discussions of the issues," with a warning that if the U.S. does not come up with a new method of calculation acceptable to North Korea and sticks to the worn-out scenario, the "DPRK-U.S. dealings may come to an end."
A week later her director-general foresaw "two options: crisis or chance" for the upcoming working-level talks. The talks "could either contribute to improving relations or add to the hostility towards each other. It is up to the U.S. to make the choice."
The American negotiators should know by now that an early big deal ― a comprehensive and total denuclearization plan that Bolton had tried ― will not be accepted by the North Koreans.
At the beginning, Washington should first set the goal of working-level talks ― either to prepare for another hurried summit with another nebulous agreement for denuclearization with few concrete details. Or to make practical progress in a long-haul denuclearization process toward an eventual summit that will formerly seal a set of final agreements negotiated on the working level.
Perhaps for a restart, Washington should: (1) work on a mutually understood definition of "complete denuclearization", (2) secure an official statement of commitment on paper against the resumption of nuclear or long-range missile tests on the part of the North, and (3) negotiate an agreement to stop all aspects of the North's continuing production and development activities for their nuclear and missile program.
An agreement to dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear complex that was discussed unsuccessfully at Hanoi could be a first step to the dismantlement of the North's vast nuclear arsenal hidden in several sites.
While it will be difficult to get a complete list of the North's WMD programs, a verification system to confirm the implementation of negotiated agreements is an essential component of denuclearization. A thorough verification regime is a prerequisite to any successful implementation of a nuclear deal.
North Korea would be unlikely to commit themselves to a timeline or a road map. They would want to drag on the nuclear negotiation as long as possible, inching towards the stated goal of denuclearization. They would try to squeeze as many concessions as possible from the U.S.
Nevertheless, if Washington wants to move forward, it will have to give some sort of material substance to Pyongyang. The North complains about joint U.S.-South drills, but they do not feel the threat of an imminent attack. Therefore, they would prefer sanctions easing over the termination of joint military exercise, an end-of-war declaration, a non-aggression pact or an exchange of liaison offices.
Diplomacy is still relevant to the issue of war and peace on the peninsula.
[The Korea Times, 2019-9-23]
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2019/09/137_276007.html