- 김동현 일민국제관계연구원 방문학자
In a 24-page document on Interim National Security Strategic Guidance released March 3, President Joe Biden instructed his security team still developing a new strategy toward North Korea to employ "diplomacy as our tool of first resort."
The new guidance said the administration will "empower diplomats to work to reduce the threats posed by North Korea's growing nuclear and missile programs, standing shoulder-to-shoulder with the Republic of Korea and Japan."
Biden's guidance did not mention "the denuclearization of North Korea" as an overarching goal of his policy. Reduction of the threats from North Korea would be an initial objective by curbing and containing an ever-increasing North Korean arsenal, while working toward ultimate denuclearization.
On the other hand, his plan for empowering diplomats confirms Biden's earlier statement that he would discard the failed top-down diplomacy practiced by his predecessor and return to the normal bottom-up approach, starting at a working-level.
Washington is calling for the strengthening of alliances and partners in the region to stand up to the ambitious rise of China, the only country capable of, and interested in, changing the existing rules-based international order.
In a major foreign policy address last week, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken listed China as one of the eight most urgent priorities, including the COVID-19 pandemic, the global economy, democracy, alliances, climate change, immigration, and U.S. leadership in technology.
The United States appears ready politically, economically, and militarily to compete, collaborate or confront China from a position of strength, mustering the support and participation of its allies in a campaign to contain its rival.
In this regard, the Moon Jae-in administration should be prepared to clarify its position on China upon a reportedly scheduled visit to Seoul by the U.S. secretaries of state and defense around mid-March.
The goal of Nixon's opening of China was to decouple China from the Soviet Union, and that goal was achieved at the end of the Cold War. Until recently, no U.S. president sought for China's political reform so as to accommodate Western democracy and freedom.
Washington and Beijing are now in a clash not just over economic interests but also over values, system of governance, and ideology, as if in a "clash of civilizations." Biden will not allow China to set an international agenda. However, he is open to work with China when possible.
Biden's guidance also will require taking "steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy," while ensuring the security and effectiveness of the strategic deterrent and keeping the U.S. commitment of extended deterrence to its allies. Biden's team is expected to publish its own Nuclear Posture Review within its first year in office.
Both diplomacy and deterrence so far have failed to denuclearize North Korea. However, deterrence has helped prevent a major invasion from the North since 1953. The concept of deterrence is based on the simple logic that a rational actor will restrain from taking an action if the benefits of his action do not greatly outweigh the cost of the same action.
As a deterrent to North Korean attack, the ROK-U.S. alliance has demonstrated its credible capabilities and operational plans to wage massive retaliation to the end of destroying the North Korean regime. Against the backdrop of extended deterrence, the combined forces kept a favorable balance of military power, maintaining readiness through routine exercises, and with occasional flexing of strategic assets.
A much publicized decapitation plan to get rid of the North Korean leader may reinforce the deterrent effect. Kim Jong-un is the sole, codified authority over the command and control of North Korean nuclear weapons. Yet, if he was seriously concerned about the plan, he could have delegated the nuclear code to one or two of his subordinates ― to either his army general chief of staff or the commander of his strategic force or to both.
Advocacy for redeployment of tactical nuclear warheads to the South or development of South Korea's own nuclear weapon is ill conceived and ill advised. These ideas will weaken or destroy the basis for seeking a negotiated denuclearization and they would contribute to accelerating a regional nuclear arms race.
In the meantime, the U.S. is developing a non-kinetic "left of launch" capability that can detect, disrupt, and disable missile launches with the support of space sensors and cyber technology. When this technology becomes operational, it will supplement the land-based interceptor systems. However, a pre-emptive disabling of test launches, except in an act of actual hostility, may risk a retaliation of kinetic strikes.
The efficacy of deterrence should be amplified by diplomatic declarations of peaceful intent. It is a big challenge for diplomacy to persuade the North that the deterrence, which naturally includes exercises, is intended for defense, not for invasion. Diplomacy and deterrence can work together hand in hand.
[The Korea Times, 2021-03-11]
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2021/03/137_305318.html