[칼럼] N. Korea's shifting demands

김동현 일민국제관계연구원 방문학자

Last April North Korean leader Kim Jong-un set a year-end deadline for U.S. flexibility to accept Pyongyang's demands. Last week Stephen Biegun, top U.S. nuclear negotiator and a nominee for deputy secretary of state, said the deadline was "an artificial one" ― an implication that the U.S. won't make a major policy adjustment to meet the deadline and that the current stalemate may pass over the year-end.

Announcing the deadline, Kim said he would take a "new path" if the deadline is missed. North Korean officials have suggested, as foreign observers speculated, that a "new path" points to resuming nuclear and ICBM tests, terminating negotiations and returning to confrontation and tension.

The North conducted another test of "a super-large multiple rocket launch system" Nov. 28 ― the fourth one since August ― firing two projectiles 30 seconds apart toward the East Sea. The system is known as a hybrid of ballistic missile technology that carries four large rockets. Some news outlets called the firing a Thanksgiving reminder to Washington of Kim's deadline.

It could have been a warning to the U.S. to keep the deadline with a new negotiating position acceptable to Pyongyang. On the other hand, it may have been simply to test the operational applicability of the weapons system targeting South Korea and U.S. forces in the South. Intended or not, it still had an impact on nuclear diplomacy.

The U.S. decision to cancel a joint U.S.-South Korean air force exercise ― Vigilant Ace ― was not enough for the North to return to working-level talks that Washington has sought after since their breakdown in Sweden Oct. 5. Trump's personal relationship with Kim is no longer enough. Pyongyang does not want to give Trump any more opportunity for which he claims credit, unless it gains enough in return.

Washington does not seem ready to meet the North's demand for a major adjustment in U.S. negotiating strategy, still focusing on denuclearization first before lifting major sanctions. The North seeks to gain tangible rather than symbolic benefits from negotiations, such as sanctions relief and a peace treaty rather than symbolic declarations or agreements that are not legally binding by international law.

The North regards the Singapore agreement as a victory, in which it made no concessions except for its commitment to an ambiguous "complete denuclearization." Following no deal from Hanoi, Pyongyang first demanded a new U.S. "method of calculation" to accept Pyongyang's proposal of a phased denuclearization process with corresponding measures of lifting sanctions not after denuclearization, but in the process of denuclearization.

The North wants rewards for the steps it has already taken or will take in the future. Then the North's demand shifted from sanctions lifting to security guarantee. After Hanoi, Kim Jong-un started stressing the need for self-reliant economic development. Kim said he will not concede on North Korea's national interest for the sake of seeking sanctions relief.

Most recently, the North shifted its demand to removal of "U.S. hostility" as the main condition for returning to talks. In short, the North demands that the U.S. should be prepared to discuss and take actions: to lift sanctions, terminate joint military drills, stop employing cutting-edge war assets around the peninsula, delist North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism, and stop raising human rights issues. The North also demands conclusion of a peace treaty and a treaty of normalization.

Now Kim Jong-un says the North has developed enough deterrent to the U.S. nuclear threat. Yet, he keeps developing and perfecting his weapons of mass destruction. The people in the country are struggling with the crippling impact of sanctions. Kim said, "The people's pain from sanctions has turned into anger." Next to security, Kim's priority is to provide a minimum standard of living for the people. He knows that if he fails, it could jeopardize the survival of his regime.

Working-level talks may not resume, not to mention a third U.S.-North Korea summit, before the end of the year. Given the limits of U.S. flexibility, the future prospects for denuclearization talks seem to depend more on the North, which closely watches Trump and American politics as they may relate to North Korea.

As long as the North refuses to deal with the South, there is not much South Korea can do to promote the resumption of nuclear talks, unlike in the case of the first two U.S.-North Korea summits. Unless a breakthrough comes through somehow during the remainder of the month, it will be Kim Jong-un's New Year's address for 2020 that will shed light on what could happen to the fate of denuclearization.

That's where we are today on North Korea.

[The Korea Times, 2019-12-02]
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2019/12/137_279633.html