[칼럼] N. Korea hunkering down

김동현 일민국제관계연구원 방문학자

It was a good thing that Iran and the United States backed down from the verge of war, after a U.S. drone strike killed top Iranian general Qassem Soleimani, a known mastermind of terror who killed many Americans. It was a tragedy that Iran mistakenly shot down a Ukraine airliner, killing all 176 aboard, most of whom were Iranians.

Soleimani's death also prompted speculation of what impact it may have on North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Was he scared? Was he hiding in a bunker for fear of a potential U.S. strike? He may have been scared, but he was not hiding. He was back on the road to give "on-the-spot guidance" to staff at a fertilizer plant.

Does the U.S. have the capability to take him out? Probably, yes. The question is what happens next? The North has enough lethal capability to retaliate to such an attack and inflict an unbearable degree of damage to the U.S. forces in the South. Will the U.S. termination of Soleimani soften North Korea's posture on nuclear weapons? No, it is likely to harden their position to accelerate the development of nuclear weapons.

Last week, Seoul's national security adviser Chung Eui-yong announced the South had delivered Trump's birthday message to Kim Jong-un. The next day, on Jan. 11, Pyongyang's foreign ministry advisor, Kim Kye-gwan, said his boss had already received Trump's "personal letter of birthday greetings" through a "special liaison channel" of the two top leaders. Kim Kye-gwan scorned the South to stay out of Pyongyang's relations with Washington. In this episode, Trump did not make the South look good.

Earlier, Trump called Kim "a man of his word," hoping he will keep his self-imposed moratorium on missile and nuclear tests and fulfill his commitment to denuclearization. However, from the North Korean Workers Party's 5th plenary meeting of the 7th Central Committee, and the latest statement by the foreign ministry's adviser, it is clear that the North will not return to nuclear talks, unless the U.S. accepts their demands.

The party plenary held during Dec. 28-31 released an official report through KCNA on Jan. 1, replacing Kim's customary New Year's address. Through the report the North Korean leader revealed that he is preparing for "a protracted stalemate" in nuclear talks. He is focusing on self-reliance to fight sanctions and continuing to perfect a strategic deterrent, perhaps signaling a return to the "byeongjin" policy of a parallel development of nuclear weapons and the economy.

Kim mentioned "a new strategic weapon" and "a shocking, actual action" that the world will see soon, provoking pundits' imagination that the North might be on the way to test a multiple reentry vehicle for ICBMs, a new submarine launched ballistic missile, or a more advanced long-range solid-fuel missile.

But, there was no indication that Kim was about to cross Washington's de facto redline by resuming the testing of long-range missiles or nuclear bombs. He listed reasons why he no longer feels obliged to keep his moratorium. But he did not terminate it. He blamed the U.S. for the failure of talks, vowing that he will not trade his nuclear weapons for sanctions relief.

The party meeting covered a mid-to-long term domestic strategy for survival and development under the crippling sanctions. Only one of the "Eight Decisions" adopted in the plenary's "resolution" was related to foreign policy, which read, "We will guarantee the victory in the offensive for making a breakthrough head-on through a powerful political, diplomatic and military offensive."

Unlike last year, the North seems to be hunkering down on waging rhetorical threats. Kim Jong-un did not set a new deadline. There are no new verbal threats coming out of Pyongyang or an imminent prospect of a threatening provocation.

While denuclearization is becoming a more remote or unrealistic goal, Kim does not seem to have given up negotiations altogether. He understands that in an election year, Trump's hands are tied up with domestic politics, and possibly with a looming crisis in the Middle East, with little room to find flexibility on North Korea. Under the current circumstances, Kim seems to have chosen an option of wait and see.

The North still shuns the South. The party report had no mention of the South at all. The North ridicules Seoul's role of a "mediator," landing a slap in the face of President Moon's North Korea policy. In a New Year's address, Moon again offered a multitude of proposals for inter-Korean cooperation for peace and mutual economic benefits. The North remains skeptical of Moon's ability to deliver.

How long should Moon continue with his unilateral policy of accommodation without Kim's cooperation? Is it a masochistic policy?

[The Korea Times, 2020-01-13]
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2020/01/137_281826.html