[칼럼] Tumultuous time for S. Korea

김동현 일민국제관계연구원 방문학자

U.S. President Trump's May 29 decision to revoke U.S. preferential treatment of Hong Kong following China's national security legislation for the city of "one country with two systems" confirms the beginning of a fierce Cold War between the two most powerful nations in the world. Washington is also withdrawing from the World Health Organization, which Trump has said was "China-centric" and incompetent in handling the COVID-19 pandemic. China says these measures will backfire to hurt the United States.

This turn of events coincides with the pandemic tragedy and the race-related protests that started in Minnesota and quickly spread across the United States. America seems to be back in the Nixon era, fighting in the swamps of Vietnam, with domestic protests against war and civil rights marches. As Trump believes China bashing is helpful to his campaign, and as China is unlikely to back down, there will be no mitigation in the bilateral confrontation, at least until after the November election in America.

It may be nerve wracking for South Korea to watch escalating clashes between Washington and Beijing. The points of contention are quadruple: coronavirus, trade, Communist dictatorship and Hong Kong. Attacking China on all four fronts may obscure the epicenter of China's vulnerability. Trump is blunt in rhetoric but his actions are measured to protect the U.S. economy.

The new Cold War setting between China and the U.S. puts South Korea in a delicate position. China is Seoul's largest export market for $136.2 billion and the U.S., Seoul's second largest with $73.6 billion and a treaty ally providing a deterrent against the nuclear North. President Moon Jae-in is still waiting for Xi Jinping's visit to Korea this year. Without China's cooperation, it will be more difficult to denuclearize North Korea. 

So far, Seoul has resisted pressures to choose a side between the two competitors. However, as the competition intensifies, Seoul is likely to find it more difficult to exercise an acrobatic diplomacy of parallel balancing. It may have to opt for an independent position depending on the issue. 

North Korea, still the top priority of concerns in Seoul, keeps shunning the South. It rejects Seoul's continuing offers of assistance in medical and economic cooperation, even after the Moon government announced that it would not apply the May 24 restrictions on inter-Korean relations, imposed after the sinking of the ROK Navy ship Cheonan in 2010. The North demands complete decoupling of South Korea from U.S. policy on North Korea, something unthinkable for Seoul at the moment. 

On May 24, the KCNA reported that Kim Jong-un had held the Fourth Enlarged Meeting of the Seventh Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party. The thrust of the report was taken out of context by media in the West, by focusing on Kim's "new policies for further increasing the nuclear war deterrence of the country and putting the strategic armed forces on a high alert operation in line…." At the meeting, Ri Pyong-chol, the man in charge of nuclear and missile development at the Party, was promoted to vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission. 

A scrutiny of the report shows Kim's firm control of the military. Kim also elevated the KPA's general chief of staff Pak Jong-chon to vice marshal. To boost the military's morale, Kim promoted dozens of general officers to their next grade of rank at the same time. The meeting was more about internal discipline, personnel actions, training and indoctrination, and reorganization.

At this point, North Korea seems unlikely to cross the presumptive red line of exploding a new nuclear test or launching an improved ICBM. But, we know the North continues to develop its nuclear arsenal and improve its conventional firepower. The rationale for North Korea's strategic deterrence remains unchanged: to survive. This will not change until a comprehensive nuclear deal is worked out in the future.

A majority of South Koreans supports their alliance with the U.S. and the U.S. provision of a nuclear umbrella. They would prefer a continued U.S. military presence. However, they would not support the idea of using troop reduction or withdrawal, gradual or not, as a bargaining chip for nuclear negotiations. For decades, the U.S. and South Korea have maintained that any disposition of U.S. troops in Korea is a matter to be determined by the signatories of the U.S.-ROK defense treaty. 

Without an extensive threat reduction from the North, or a major reconfiguration of power dynamics in the region, the people in the South know they are stuck with the alliance. Moreover, things will evolve for better or worse. Every country should work to serve their common interest in peace and prosperity. 

[The Korea Times, 2020-06-01] 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2020/06/137_290446.html