김동현 일민국제관계연구원 방문학자
North Korea is going through a triple-crisis from sanctions, the pandemic and recent flood damage ― collectively hampering the development of its economy. The regime publicly admitted that its five-year economic plan, adopted by the 7th Congress of the Workers' Party in 2016, has failed to achieve its goal of "improving the national economy and the people's living standard" due to "severe internal and external situations and unexpected manifold challenges."
Addressing the 6th plenary meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers' Party on Aug. 19, Kim Jong-un personally acknowledged "the shortcomings" in implementing the economic plan. He attributed the failure to "unexpected and inevitable challenges in various aspects and the situation in the region surrounding the Korean Peninsula." With that, he announced the convening of the 8th Congress of the party in January 2021, which he said will present a new five-year plan.
In 2016, Kim pledged that his people "would never have to tighten their belt again." Now, all economic metrics from the crushing impact of the sanctions and the pandemic cast a dire prospect for a further decline in the North's economy. What lies ahead before North Korea is an endless struggle for survival in closed isolation and abject poverty.
The economic constraints on the regime could affect its strategic nuclear and missile development. Pyongyang has claimed that it had a sufficient strategic deterrent. Recently, it has been relatively quiet on its perceived threat of security to itself. For instance, it has been quiet on resumed U.S.-ROK exercises that started last week.
Since a realignment of its national security team with individuals, perceived as favorable to the North, the Seoul government is eager to extend aid to the North including assistance to fight the pandemic and help North Korean flood victims. The new unification minister offered "barter trade" with the North, as a circumvention of U.N. sanctions.
However, North Korea is not responding. In addition to the fear of the pandemic, there are other reasons that Kim Jong-un declines any flood aid from the South and other international sources. Not long ago, the North blew up the inter-Korean liaison office in Gaeseong, vowing not to deal with the South again. It needs time to readjust its position to face the South again. Sometimes the North Koreans tend to be too proud to be pragmatic.
The regime had also undertaken a "frontal breakthrough" to the sanctions for a self-reliant economy. The North survived until now, developing their warfighting weapons. Maybe, with the new disclosure of their failed economy, the sanctions may be proving their efficacy. Yet, it is too early to expect the regime to navigate a new strategic course.
Kim Jong-un's admission of the economic failure of his country was stunning. It broke the myth of the North Korean leader's infallibility. Kim has his own style of governance, perhaps towards a more normal statecraft. He ended a military-first policy of his father and restored the party-centered policy of his grandfather. He seems to prefer running the country by structural formality and certain rules.
On Aug. 20, South's National Intelligence Service (NIS) shared with the public its assessment of an evolving pattern of power sharing in the North, raising questions of the accuracy of, and the appropriateness of publicizing the agency's internal analysis. The agency said the North is being governed by "the rule by commissions" from its absolute leader Kim Jong-un, who it added had no health problems. It also said there was no designated successor to the current leader.
The recent absence of the leader's sister from public scenes caused some speculation of a power struggle from within. However, the NIS said Kim has delegated "a certain portion of his retrievable authority" to his sister Kim Yo-jong and a few others so that he can have "relief from the stress of personal oversight over all areas of government and for immunity from accountability in the case of a policy failure," a view Kim Jong-un may not appreciate.
According to the NIS, Kim Yo-jong is the control tower over policies to the South and the U.S. Pak Bong-ju and Kim Tok-hun, cabinet premiers, former and present respectively, are responsible for economic development. Ri Pyong-chol, vice chair of the party's Central Military Commission, is in charge of strategic weapons development, and Choe Pu-il, a department director of the party Central Committee, has military affairs.
Come January next year, after the U.S. elections are over, Pyongyang will have a better sense of what it should do with Washington and Seoul. In the meantime, it will continue struggling to stay afloat in the mire of economic hardships.
[The Korea Times, 2020-08-24]
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2020/08/137_294825.html