김동현 일민국제관계연구원 방문학자
While President Donald Trump refuses to concede, President-elect Joe Biden's transition team is moving forward to prepare the next president to be ready to lead an America already in crisis from day one in office on Jan 20. due to the pandemic and economic woes.
On foreign policy, the Biden administration is expected to rejoin the Paris climate accord, reenter the Iranian nuclear deal, extend the only remaining nuclear arms control deal with Russia for five more years, rejoin the World Health Organization, and end Trump's "America First" to reassure U.S. allies in Europe and the Pacific.
At the same time, there are many views of what the next administration's policy would be like for North Korea. A change of power in Washington often led to discontinuity in policy, with an incoming administration repudiating its predecessor's policy. Examples include George W. Bush's "anything but Clinton's" policy and Trump's tearing down of Obama's policy.
This column shares the view that Biden is unlikely to return to Obama's failed policy of "strategic patience", which was to wait for North Korea's change or its collapse from within, while toughening sanctions on the North. Vice President Biden was not in charge of North Korea policy. During that period, the conservative governments in Seoul were telling Washington that the North would collapse soon. North Korea is still here, as a bigger threat today.
Biden's preference of a "bottom up approach" will require empowerment of, or delegation of authority to, working-level negotiators to pull off any meaningful agreement that would be subject to approval by their leadership. However, it would not be helpful it Biden lowers the level of his chief representative below that of an undersecretary.
While developing a new strategy, it would be helpful to stabilize the Korean situation, if the Biden administration announces its willingness to honor Trump's 2018 Singapore agreement with Kim Jong-un, in addition to his earlier commitment to resolve the nuclear issue through diplomacy.
The Singapore agreement provides a good basis to build on, precisely because of its vagueness and its lack of details for action that impeded further progress. This agreement has set the right agenda for further negotiations on three major issues: Complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, new relations between the United States and the DPRK, and a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean peninsula.
Reviving some of the notions of the previously agreed provisions where they are still relevant and keeping the Singapore agreement could manifest Biden's political will to engage the DPRK. It would save a lot of time to make progress on the treacherous path to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
On the other hand, Pyongyang should realize that the Biden team would take time to decide how it will deal with North Korea. It should restraint itself from any temptation of drawing attention by exploding another nuclear device or firing a long-range missile. The North can signal that it is willing to resume dialogue with Washington, knowing that Biden will never accept it as a nuclear state.
In the meantime, Biden and Kim should first stop reckless and unproductive name-callings of each other. Biden should make clear Trump's red line on Kim's nuclear or ICBM test is still on. Kim's verbal promise of a moratorium to Trump in Singapore has been in effect, but not without complaints, due to his hope for a good deal from Trump. Now, that will not be the case.
To put a brake on the North's provocative behavior, Biden's team may seek a renewed moratorium from Kim's. The team may want to revisit the Feb 29, 2012 "Leap Day" deal, in which the North had agreed to implement a moratorium on long-range missile launches, nuclear tests, and nuclear activities at Yongbyon.
The North had also accepted the U.S. demand for the return of IAEA inspectors to verify and monitor the moratorium on uranium enrichment activities at Yongbyon. In return, Washington agreed to provide to the North with 240,000 tons of nutritional aid.
This agreement evaporated after Pyongyang launched the Kwangmyongsong-3 earth observation satellite to mark the 100th anniversary of the birth of the country's founder the late Kim Il-sung, April 15, shortly after the current North Korean leader came into power, to whom the consolidation of his powerbase was more important than the promised nutritional assistance from the Obama administration.
On several occasions since 1994, the U.S. has assured that it has no hostile intent toward North Korea, and that it is prepared to improve relations with the DPRK. If Biden picks up his country's North Korea policy by repeating "no hostile intent towards the North," we will have a better hope for peace on the peninsula.
[The Korea Times, 2020-11-16]
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2020/11/137_299329.html