- 김동현 일민국제관계연구원 방문학자
In just three weeks since its inauguration, the Biden administration has revealed its direction of charting American foreign policy to "engage and lead" the world again, with an emphasis on diplomacy, democracy and human rights. It has repealed a number ― but not all ― of the policies that were pursued by its predecessor.
There is some continuity in the thrust of U.S. policy on China and in its national defense posture. The 2018 national defense strategy will remain in effect, while it will be reviewed and updated. Biden's security team is reviewing a host of foreign policy issues, including North Korean nuclear threats, to come up with new strategies.
The Biden team has extended the New START treaty with Russia for another five years. The U.S. has ended its support for a Saudi-led military offensive in Yemen. It has halted Trump's plan to redeploy U.S. troops out of Germany. It has joined international pressure on the military coup in Burma. It will also review the Afghanistan situation to decide whether to withdraw the remaining U.S. troops from there by May.
North Korea has been receding in priorities behind China, Russia, Iran and other issues. Yet, Biden is committed to working together with South Korea on the North Korea issue. He has discussed the matter with the leaders of South Korea and Japan over the phone, and agreed to pursue a common goal of denuclearization.
The sequencing of the phone calls, or the nuanced differences in the discussions between the calls ― between "a corner stone" in reference to Japan and "a linchpin" to reference South Korea ― do not really matter as much as the comprehensive review of North Korea policy now under way in Washington.
It is unknown how long a North Korea policy review may take or how the U.S. team may consult their allies in Seoul and Tokyo. They will surely hear out the views and assessments of their allies before they formulate a new U.S. strategy. It is not difficult to set a common goal, but it will not be easy for all parties to share the same perspectives on North Korea. In any case, once a new strategy is completed, the allies will be expected to support it.
Last week, the National Assembly, in a hearing for the nomination of Chung Eui-yong for foreign minister, disclosed the divided views of hopes and concerns, with regards to the potential opportunity for cooperation and the potential schism between Seoul and Washington. The ruling party wants to continue with President Moon's "peace process" and to maintain a flexible balancing strategy between Washington and Beijing. The opposition party wants to end the "illusionary policy of appeasement" towards the North, and to join the U.S. against China.
The opposition party seems to prefer more sanctions and a stronger military deterrent against the North. Some opposition members support redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the South or the development of the South's own nuclear weapons. They believe that the North Korean regime is more collapsible now than before.
Chung believes that Kim is still committed to denuclearization, as he told Trump and Moon. He thinks Kim's announcement at the eighth congress of the Workers' Party, to develop more sophisticated nuclear weapons, was designed to raise the North's leverage in expectation of negotiations with the U.S. This assessment has no basis in evidence.
There are a few basic assumptions that the U.S. review team should avoid:
1) Do not be trapped in the box of thinking that the North will never denuclearize. Under this assumption, there is no need to try a diplomatic effort for denuclearization. The North has changed its position before. It can change it again.
2) Do not bet on the fallacy of "collapse from within." The internal security of the regime has been strengthened under Kim Jong-un. It survived the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the "arduous march" of starvation in the 1990s.
3) Do not rely on sanctions. Additional sanctions will contribute to the hardening of the North's resolve to hold on to its nuclear program, rather than to return to the table. Sanctions relief, along with other conditional rewards, will be a more powerful tool for incentivizing the North to be serious about its future without nuclear weapons.
4) Do not rely exclusively on deterrence. Reinforcement of the deterrence, including an adequate level of joint exercises, is an effective measure of preventing war, but it does not contribute directly to denuclearization. An excessive show of nuclear force would likely lead to an arms race and an intensification of tensions, threatening peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.
5) Do not return to the failed policy of "strategic patience.“
[The Korea Times, 2021-02-08]
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2021/02/137_303723.html