[칼럼] Biden’s options on N. Korea

- 김동현 일민국제관계연구원 방문학자

Not much is known about how the Biden administration is doing in developing a new strategy to address the threats of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. It is widely known that in the course of formulating a new policy, Biden's security team will coordinate closely with U.S. allies and partners in the region.

There has been no communication or engagement between Washington and Pyongyang since Biden took office. Last week, the State Department said that North Korea is "an urgent priority" for the United States and Washington remains committed to the denuclearization of the North.

North Korea has been quiet, with no provocative activities. General Secretary Kim Jong-un said during the eighth party congress in January that his regime would respond to the U.S. in kind with "tough on tough" and "good for good": He also vowed to bolster his nuclear deterrent, calling the United States "the biggest enemy of his country." However, he did not exclude dialogue with Washington.

Maybe, Pyongyang is waiting for Washington to come up with a new strategy. Maybe, it is too pressed attending to its urgent economic and other domestic problems. The North depends more than before on China for economic survival, while turning to deeper isolation from the rest of the world.

Domestic control is a top priority for the regime. It is tightening up central control over quasi-state and private economic activities. It is shutting off loopholes for cultural influxes from the South. It is focused on an existential battle to fight a devastated economy due to the COVID-19 border closures and the accumulative impact of crippling sanctions. It keeps an alert for the COVID-19 pandemic.

If history were a guide, North Korea may still launch a missile or nuclear test at an early period of the Biden administration that may aim to remind the world of its existence or to leverage its position. This specter of provocation can be mitigated if Washington communicates a message to Pyongyang through the DPRK mission in New York or by a public announcement that the United States will engage North Korea upon completion of a policy review.

North Korea will not easily dismantle its nuclear arsenal that it has built with scarce resources for decades. The North lived under the threat of U.S. nuclear weapons for many years. The United States deployed hundreds of tactical nuclear warheads to South Korea between 1958 and 1991. Later, Washington started providing the South with a nuclear umbrella, by mobile strategic forces.

The North is aware that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is at least 100 times larger than its own. The North may not be able to strike the homeland United States with an accurate nuclear missile yet, but it can strike the U.S. forces in South Korea and Japan. The North believes its nuclear arsenal helps deter a preventive strike against it.

There are no good options on North Korea. Military action should be excluded as an option. Deliberate disregard of the North does not reduce its threat. Ultimately, diplomacy remains the only viable option. The main goal of diplomacy is to negotiate a peaceful solution to disputes between states.

There is a good argument that the most pragmatic approach to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula should follow "a long-term, phased and reciprocal process," in which both sides first agree on capping and containment of the North's arsenal, and gradually moving toward the reduction and dismantlement of Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs.

Progress should be transactional, action for action. It should proceed in line with a cycle of agreement to implementation, from implementation to trust building, and trust to further agreement. A minimum goal is to assure a safer environment for the region and the United States.

Perhaps for the sake of substance apart from process, the 2018 Singapore agreement on improved relations, settlement of peace and denuclearization can be a starting point, as an agreed agenda for a new round of negotiations with the DPRK. This column advocated this approach in November, long before the Seoul government embraced it.

It is a good thing that the Biden administration has restored a transparent style of policy discussion, with daily briefings at the White House and the State Department, and frequent discussions by the president and his key advisors on major foreign policy issues. All should remember that without peace, there will be no chance for the development of democracy and human rights.

This writer hopes that the same veteran members of the Biden team who failed on North Korea before will transform themselves in terms of thinking, approach and policy so that they will succeed this time.

[The Korea Times, 2021-02-22]
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2021/02/137_304383.html