[칼럼] Trump’s Middle East Campaign Is Straining the U.S.-South Korea Alliance
- 스캇 스나이더 (한미경제연구소소장)
The U.S.-South Korea alliance has always required careful management of two competing anxieties: fear of abandonment and fear of entrapment. Right now, both are intensifying at the same time. President Donald Trump’s public call for South Korea to escort oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz on March 14 coincided with the Pentagon’s transfer of Patriot missiles and THAAD batteries off the Korean Peninsula, with no certain return date. The simultaneity raises hard questions about the credibility of U.S. defense commitments at a moment when alliance coordination matters most.
Although Trump later posted that the United States no longer needs allied assistance, it is not the first time that Washington has requested Seoul’s assistance with “out of area” operations. The Roh Moo-hyun administration faced a similar test two decades ago during the Iraq War, ultimately making the third-largest troop contribution among U.S. allies to the stabilization of Iraq.
The U.S.-South Korea alliance gained strength from the experience and, in fact, utilized the opportunity to release a joint vision for the alliance that established a comprehensive security partnership in 2009. But this time, the moment feels different. South Korean trust in the United States is running thin, military resources and capacities to sustain effective deterrence are stretched, and transactionalism appears to have obscured shared interests as the foundation for pursuing alliance cooperation.
In both the Iraq War and the ongoing Iran conflict, the U.S. request for assistance from South Korea creates the worst possible dynamic between alliance partners: cross-cutting anxieties about both abandonment and entrapment. U.S. Patriot missiles and THAAD batteries are reportedly leaving the peninsula, similar to a U.S. brigade leaving South Korea for Iraq two decades ago, with no certain date of return. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung stated, “While we have expressed opposition, the reality is that we cannot fully push through our position.” The public floating of an informal request by President Trump—although subsequently rescinded—with no apparent prior discussion unnecessarily feeds doubts about the credibility of U.S. commitments to South Korea’s defense.
If Trump, who often reverses course only to revisit demands later, repeats his call for allied assistance in the Strait of Hormuz, South Korea’s interests in oil price stabilization and showcasing alliance solidarity are clear. But the potential price to be paid in terms of human life is too dear, and the theater is too distant for South Korea to justify the economic and human costs of pursuing energy security. In the Iraq War, South Korea ultimately provided over 3,000 troops to the stabilization of northern Iraq following the end of military operations. But that contribution occurred as part of Iraq’s reconstruction rather than during the conflict itself.
Moreover, the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran has limited U.S. deterrence capabilities, fueling a competition for resources between the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East while depleting resources necessary to uphold deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. These commitments ignore priorities already signaled in the Trump administration’s National Defense Strategy, which prioritizes the Western Hemisphere and the first island chain while turning over primary responsibility for deterring North Korea to South Korea.
South Koreans are putting less stock in U.S. pledges of extended deterrence not only because priorities are diverting resources away from the Korean Peninsula, but also because the main lesson of the Trump administration’s transactional framework is that allies must take care of themselves. The U.S.-Korea alliance’s insurance policy premiums are going up, but the assurance that coverage will be forthcoming from President Trump in the event of a need for a payout is declining markedly.
The U.S.-South Korea alliance has grown in scope, and the two countries have deepened coordination over the past two decades to expand beyond a primary focus on deterring North Korea to a much more integrated instrument in which both sides are bound together by shared economic interests and global stability. But both abandonment and entrapment concerns remain factors that must be managed effectively to sustain effective future cooperation. U.S. requests for South Korean assistance in Iran should not become a turning point that threatens the gains made over the past two decades following Washington’s last request for Seoul’s assistance.
[KEI, 2026-03-18]